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INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 1978, the United States Congress expressed its
growing concern over the Republic of South Africa's policy of
apartheid and the escalating racial violence in South Africa over
that policy' by amending the Export-Import Bank Act of 19452 to
restrict financial support given by the Export-Import Bank of the
United States ("Bank" or "Eximbank") to purchasers of United
States exports in South Africa.' Since the signing of the Evans
Amendment, the Bank has not been involved in any transactions
in South Africa.4
Despite the controversial nature of the South African apartheid
policy 5 and the politically divisive efforts 6f the United States
Congress to fashion an appropriate national response, little effort
has been directed toward analyzing the effects of the Evans
Amendment. After reviewing the political background and legislative history of the Amendment,6 this Article will summarize the
effects of the Amendment on Eximbank activity in South Africa,
examine the reasons for these effects, analyze the degree to which
American exporters and South African purchasers have borne the
cost of the Amendment, and draw conclusions regarding the efficacy of the Evans Amendment in its stated objectives.

1. For details of the events of 1976 and 1977, see infra text accompanying
notes 51-62.
2. 12 U.S.C. §§ 635-635n (1982) (commonly referred to as the Evans
Amendment).
3. For a discussion of the content of the Evans Amendment, see infra text
accompanying notes 144-51.
4. See infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
5. Apartheid is a policy of segregation and political and economic discrimination against non-Europeans in South Africa.
6. The background analysis focuses almost exclusively on the legislative progress of the Evans Amendment through the United States House of Representatives, principally because the final version of the Amendment was substantially
similar to the amendment as passed in the House. See H.R. 6415, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 13,235-36 (1977).
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II.

THE EXIMBANK AND SOUTH AFRICA

A.

Functions of the Eximbank

The Export-Import Bank of the United States was created in
1934, 7 and was established as an independent agency of the
United States Government in 1945.8 The Eximbank provides assistance to United States exporters through a variety of loan,
guarantee, and insurance programs.9 The theoretical basis for the
Bank's existence was the recognition that the private sector is
often unwilling to finance sales to purchasers abroad, even though
similar sales are financed to domestic purchasers. The private sector's unwillingness to finance foreign purchasers stems from several factors, including a plethora of political risks in nations
around the world and the potential difficulty in obtaining repayment from foreign purchasers. The role of the Eximbank, particularly with regard to its guarantee and insurance programs, is to
assume these risks.
The assumption of risk by the Bank enables the private sector
to extend credit at competitive rates, whereas, without the Bank's
assistance, the cost of credit extended by the private sector would
be prohibitively high. Thus, when a foreign purchaser receives a
guarantee from the Eximbank for the purchase of goods from a
United States exporter, a United States commercial bank is able
to extend credit to the foreign buyer without the risk of default.
If the foreign purchaser defaults on its obligations, the Eximbank
assumes the repayment obligations to the commercial bank as
7. Exec. Order No. 6581, Feb. 2, 1934.
8. Act of July 31, 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-173, 59 Stat. 526 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 65).
9. During the ten year period from 1968 to 1977, the Eximbank assisted in
the sale of approximately 11.7% of all United States exports. Because the Bank
ostensibly offers its services only when the private sector is unwilling to independently finance export transactions, many export transactions would not have
been realized without the Eximbank's assistance. Figures for the transactions
supported by the Eximbank were taken from the EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 10-11, 1976 ANNuAL REPORT 16-17, 1971
ANNUAL REPORT 28 [Annual Reports hereinafter cited as EXIMBANK [year] ANNUAL REPORT].

Figures for total U.S. exports were taken from the 1974-80 DI-

RECTION OF TRADE STATISTICS Y.B. 380 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1974-80
TRADE STAT. Y.B.]; 11 DIRECTION OF TRADE ANN. 1969-75 230 (1976) [hereinafter

cited as TRADE ANN.]; DIRECTION OF TRADE ANN. 1966-70 106 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as TRADE ANN. 1966-70] all of which are publications of the International
Monetary Fund.
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well as the responsibility to collect the indebtedness from the foreign purchaser. United States banks, therefore, can justify charging a lower interest rate to foreign buyers than what would be
required without the guarantee. An Eximbank guarantee costs the
foreign purchaser an average of one-quarter of one percent of the
amount guaranteed. 10 If the actual savings in interest expense on
the loan are greater than one-quarter of one percent, the Eximbank guarantee will enable the purchaser to incur lower total
financing costs. In effect, an Eximbank guarantee often works as a
subsidy to the foreign purchaser. The United States exporter also
benefits from the grant of an Eximbank guarantee by receiving
payment directly from a commercial bank and avoiding the political and commercial risks inherent in international sales
transactions.
Since its inception, the Bank has supported over $100 billion in
export sales, has returned over $1 billion in dividends to the
United States Treasury," and has required no appropriations
from the United States Congress. Although it was initially authorized to exchange all of its capital stock in return for $1 billion
from the United States Treasury, 12 the Eximbank has annually
drawn approximately fifty percent of its funds from Federal Financing Bank loans, twenty-nine percent from Treasury loans,
and nineteen percent from the repayment of various outstanding
loans.1 3 The Bank's ability to obtain funds at favorable interest
rates, typically available only to government agencies, places it at
a cost advantage relative to private commercial institutions because the Bank is able to offer loans, loan guarantees, and insurance policies at rates lower than those available in the private
sector. In fact, the reduced interest rates, fees, and premiums are
often low enough to facilitate export transactions that otherwise
would not have taken place. Another role of the Eximbank that
has become more important in recent years has been the Bank's
maintenance of the price competitiveness of United States ex10. This estimate was arrived at by dividing the Eximbank's revenues from
insurance premiums and guarantee fees in fiscal year 1980 ($30 million) by its
total guarantee and insurance commitments as of September 30, 1980 ($11,749
million) EXIMBANK 1980 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 14, 16.
11. EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, FOR YOUR INFORMATION
FROM THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (Oct. 1981) (circular available from

Eximbank).
12. See J. HILLMAN, TH EXPORT-IMPoRT BANK AT WORK
13. EXIMBANK 1980 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 15.

15

(1982).
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ports in the face of severe competition from the generous financing policies of governmental agencies in Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and other major trading nations.14

B. Apartheid and South African Trade
It would be difficult for an article of this scope to fully describe
the historical, political, social, and economic aspects of the inter-

national debate and discord regarding South Africa. The center of
the controversy, however, is clearly apartheid; the South African
Government's set of discriminatory racial policies that are
designed to ensure separation of the races. South African law
broadly compels racial discrimination and strict racial segregation, 15 while severely restricting political dissent.1 6
The cornerstone of the Government's policy of apartheid is the
creation of ten separate and "independent" homelands for South
Africa's blacks. Thirteen percent of the nation's land has been

14. Cf. HILLMAN, supra note 12, at 10-11 (indicating Congressional concern
with European sellers' influx into South African markets as a result of government subsidies).
15. South African law severely limits the political rights of nonwhites; for
example, by completely disenfranchising blacks and by enfranchising coloreds
only to a limited extent. A compulsory system of racial registration requires
nonwhites to carry and produce identity documents on demand by law enforcement officers. Moreover, blacks cannot be members of trade unions, and strict
segregation and discrimination in all forms of public accommodations and employment are required by law. See generally infra appendix 1. The Government
has yet to establish with certainty the position of the 740,000 Asians and 2.4
million coloreds in South Africa's society, although coloreds currently are
treated separately from each other as well as from blacks and whites. D. MYERS
III, K. PROPP, D. HAUCK, & D. LIFF, U.S. BusiNEss iN SOUTH AFRICA 2 (1980),
[hereinafter cited as MYERS].

16. South African law bans black political organizations and grants police
the power to disperse. public gatherings of two or more. Criminal and civil penalties are effectively employed to enforce censorship of media reports concerning
prison brutality and mistreatment, and of any opposition to Government policies. Law enforcement officers also have broad powers to indefinitely detain
those suspected of "terrorism" (defined very broadly) without trial, and to
gather information by surveillance, mail interception, and telephone
wiretapping.
Criminal procedural law in South Africa has also been reformed to lessen restrictions on law enforcement officers. For example, prosecutors are no longer
required to establish an evidentiary basis for a guilty plea, and when a confession is determined to be inadmissible, any facts found as a consequence of that
confession are still admissible. See generally infra appendix 1.
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allocated for the independent homelands of the nation's 18.6 million blacks who comprise more than seventy percent of the nation's total population. 17 The remaining land has been reserved
for the 4.3 million whites who make up only seventeen percent of
the population."8 Moreover, the independent homelands account
for less than five percent of South Africa's agricultural production
and contain few of the nation's mineral resources.19 While South
Africa's blacks are granted the rights of citizens in the independent homelands, they are denied any political rights in the areas
designated for the whites. 20 The laws and customs of those areas
designated for whites severely restrict not only where blacks can
live and where blacks can move, but how blacks are educated, and
what occupations blacks may pursue. 21 Since roughly two-thirds

of the black population lives in areas designated for whites, this
denial of equal rights has had a severe impact on the black citizens of South Africa.22
As a result of the Government's apartheid 'policies, the per capita income for whites in South Africa has been roughly seventeen
times the per capita income for blacks, 23 and the Government
spends twenty to twenty-five times the amount per capita on the
education of whites as it does on the education of blacks.24 The
severe restrictions on the political and social activity of blacks
and the vigorous enforcement of those restrictions by the authorities have also resulted in South Africa having one of the world's
highest per capita prison populations: in 1970 and 1971, 2.2 percent of South Africa's population was imprisoned, roughly thirty
times the incarceration rate of the United Kingdom.25
During the ten years prior to 1978, United States exports accounted for approximately seventeen percent of South African
imports, 26 a figure surpassed only by exports from the United
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

MYEs, supra note 15, at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 3. See supra note 15.
MYERs, supra note 15, at 3.
J. FRIEDMAN, BASIC FACTS ON

POLICY OF APARTHEID 19-20

24. Id. at 35.
25. Id. at 48.
26. See 1974-80

THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE

(1978).

TRADE STAT. Y.B. supra note 9, at 339, 380; TRADE ANN.
1969-75, supra note 9, at 207, 230; TRADE ANN. 1966-70, supra note 9, at 106,
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Kingdom and West Germany.17 The fourth, fifth, and sixth largest exporters to South Africa-Japan, France, and Italy-cumulatively accounted for approximately twenty-one percent of South African imports.2 " With the exception of the United
Kingdom, however, the importance to the exporting country of its
exports to South Africa has been relatively small.2 9 The exports of
the United States, West Germany, Japan, France, and Italy to
South Africa during this period never exceeded 1.6 percent of
each country's respective total exports.30
Thus, exports to South Africa have not been nearly as significant to South Africa's major trading partners, including the
United States, as they have been to South Africa. This imbalance
suggests that the world's major trading nations could exercise
considerable leverage to force South Africa to achieve social reform, without subjecting themselves to the risk of serious economic loss. The perceived imbalance, however, omits one factor
that could mitigate the possibility of exercising significant leverage against South Africa: the major trading nations, including the
United States, rely heavily upon South Africa as a source for certain strategic minerals.3 1
During the ten years prior to 1978, the Eximbank assisted in
the sale of more than $903 million in exports to South Africa,
representing approximately 10.8 percent of all United States ex173.
27. United Kingdom exports accounted for 19.8% of South African imports;
West German exports accounted for 17.3%. See 1974-80 TRADE STAT. Y.B.,
supra note 9, at 168, 377; TRADE ANN. 1969-75, supra note 9, at 117, 228; TRADE
ANN. 1966-70, supra note 9, at 109, 124.
28. Japanese exports accounted for 11.2% of South African imports; French
exports 5.7%; and Italian exports 4.4%. See 1974-80 TRADE ANN. 1969-75, supra
note 9, at 113, 144, 148, TRADE ANN. 1966-70, supra note 9, at 121, 127, 145.
29. British exports to South Africa in 1971 represented 4.3% of that country's total exports. TRADE ANN. 1969-75, supra note 9, at 228.
30. United States exports to South Africa peaked at 1.4% of total exports in
1971. TRADE ANN. 1969-75, supra note 9, at 230. West German exports to South
Africa reached 1.6% of total West German exports in 1974. 1974-80 TRADE STAT.
Y.B., supra note 9, at 168. Japanese exports to South Africa reached 1.7% of
total Japanese exports in 1974. 1974-80 Id. at 226. French exports to South Africa reached 1.0% of total French exports in 1970. TRADE ANN. 1969-75, supra
note 9, at 113. Italian exports to South Africa reached 1.3% of total Italian exports in 1974. 1974-80 TRADE STAT. Y.B., supra note 9, at 218.
31. For comments on economic leverage and South African production of
strategic minerals, see Hearing,infra note 36, at 127-28 & Table VII (statement
of Andrew G. Racz).
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ports to South Africa during that period. 2 This percentage was
comparable to the Bank's world-wide level of assistance as a percentage of total United States exports during the same period. 3
Actual guarantee and insurance authorizations by the Bank (no
direct loans were made during the period) totaled more than $570
million, approximately 6.8 percent of the full contract value of
United States exports. 4 Since it is the policy of the Bank to act
as a co-guarantor in its world-wide activity, the Bank's authorizations to South Africa have constituted, on the average, sixty-three
percent of the full contract value of the exports supported.35
C. Eximbank Policies and South Africa
The Evans Amendment was not the first attempt by the United
States to use the Eximbank to express opposition to South Africa's apartheid policies. In 1964 the Johnson Administration prohibited the Eximbank from making direct loans available for export trade with South Africa, 8 and the direct loan prohibition
has remained in effect. The Johnson Administration in 1964 also
restricted the Eximbank's insurance and guarantee terms to periods of not more than five years,3 7 a restriction that effectively ex32. Figures are based on data sent to the author from the Export-Import
Bank of the United States in February 1982, pursuant to a request made under
the Freedom of Information Act [hereinafter cited as Eximbank Data]. The Eximbank Data contains a record of the seller, the purchaser, the date, the transaction amount, the authorization amount, and a description of the product sold for
each transaction that the Eximbank has supported with South African purchasers. (For 27 transactions occurring before 1971 and totalling $26,102,000 the
name of the United States exporter is not listed).
33. During this period the Bank assisted 11.7% of total United States exports. See supra note 9.
34. See Eximbank Data, supra note 32.
35. This Article will focus on Eximbank authorization values rather than full
contract values. A rough estimate of full contract value can generally be obtained by multiplying the authorization amount by 1.6. Id.
36. Export-Import Bank and Trade with South Africa: Hearing on H.R.
9746 Before the Subcomm. on International Trade, Investment, and Monetary
Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hearing]. Prior to 1964, however,
the Eximbank had made only one loan for exports to South Africa. In 1952 the
Bank loaned $19.6 million to the Electricity Supply Company of South Africa, a
parastatal organization, for the purchase of a power facility. The only other authorization to South Africa of any kind prior to 1964 was for insurance coverage
in the amount of $36,300 in 1963. See Eximbank Data, supra note 32.
37. See Hearing,supra note 36, at 1.
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cluded Eximbank assistance for large South African projects with
long repayment terms. In 1971 the Nixon Administration extended the terms of the guarantee and insurance programs to ten
years and opened the Bank's discount loan guarantee program to
South African trade. 8 Although the prohibition on direct loans
remained intact, the effect of the Nixon Administration's actions
was dramatic: total Eximbank authorizations in South Africa
jumped from $7.36 million in 1970, to $78.6 million in 1971, to
$121.9 million in 1972, and to a record high of $142.1 million in
1975. " In 1970 Eximbank authorizations represented 1.3 percent
of all United States exports to South Africa; in 1971 they represented 12.6 percent; in 1972 they represented 20.2 percent; and in
1975 they represented 10.9 percent.40 Prior to 1970, Eximbank authorizations represented more than one percent of United States
exports to South Africa in only two instances.

38. Id. at 1-2.
39. See Eximbank Data, supra note 32.
40. See supra notes 26 and 39 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 141

EXIMBANK AUTHORIZATIONS TO PURCHASERS IN SOUTH AFRICA
Year
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1964
a

19 6 3 b

1962

Number of
Transactions

Total
Authorizations

6
41
56
54
36
62
74
28
13
16
7
3
9
2
4
1
1

$ 15,106,000
23,268,746
35,967,941
142,127,452
78,593,700
61,789,024
121,879,350
78,625,486
7,362,060
4,240,520
1,438,300
11,758,400
3,883,112
162,700
497,194
36,300
19,600,000

1952-78

Authorizations as
a % of U.S. Exports

1.39
2.18
2.66
10.90
6.38
8.28
20.20
12.60
1.30
0.84
0.32
2.75
0.97

$606,336,285

a no transactions between 1952 and 1963
b no transactions betore 1952

In 1977 the Eximbank, on its own initiative, adopted a policy of
limiting its new authorizations in South Africa to terms of no
more than three and one-half years.4 2 The House of Representa-

tives authorized the Bank to adopt this new policy in 1977 by
amending the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945.43 The amendment provided that before authorizing any loan or guarantee, the
Board of Directors of the Eximbank shall "take into account, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, the observance of and
respect for human rights in the country to receive the exports
supported by a loan or financial guarantee and the effect such
exports may have on human rights in such country." 44 Because
the Bank was merely required to consider human rights concerns
along with the effect of the export on United States employment,
on the competitiveness of United States industry, and on the
41.
42.
43.
44.

See Eximbank Data, supra note 32.
See Hearing, supra note 36, at 2.
See Act of Oct. 26, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-143, 91 Stat. 1210.
Id.
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availability of materials in short supply,4 5 it retained considerable
flexibility in its authorization decisions and some congressmen
doubted whether the amendment would have any effect. 46 Nevertheless, during the one year that the amendment was in effect,47 it
was used to restrict Eximbank activity in four countries, including South Africa." In addition to its concern with the human
rights policy of the South African Government, it appears that
the Bank determined the internal unrest in South Africa 9 precluded adequate assurance of repayment on any financing with a
term of more than three and one-half years.50
Indeed, the years 1976 and 1977 were among the most turbulent years in the history of South Africa during this century. The
same events that caused the Eximbank to reassess the political
risks in South Africa spurred some members of the United States
Congress to search for ways in which the United States Government could more effectively express its condemnation of the racial policies of the South African Government.

III.

THE EVANS AMENDMENT

A.

Events in South Africa

Prior to 1976, the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre was the worst single incident of racial violence under the South African National
Party Government which was installed in 1948. In March of that
year 67 blacks were killed and 187 were wounded in the black
township of Sharpeville when police opened fire on several hundred blacks who had been involved in a nonviolent demonstration
against "pass laws. ''5 1 In June of 1976 racial violence in the black
township of Soweto left 176 dead (including only two whites),
1128 injured, and 894 arrested or detained. 2 The rioting appar-

45. See 123 CONG. REC. 13,238 (1977) (statement of Rep. Stanton).
46. See e.g., id. at 13,239 (statement of Rep. Badillo).
47. The amendment was effective from October 1977 until November 1978
when it was deleted from the Act. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
48. The other three countries were Uganda, Chile, and Uruguay. See 124
CONG. RE c. 16,060 (1978) (statement of Rep. Pease).
49. See infra text accompanying notes 51-62.
50. See Hearing,supra note 36, at 2.
51. South Africa: The Telltale Wounds, NEwswEEF, May 16, 1960, at 52. A
"pass law" is a South African law requiring nonwhites to carry race classification
documents at all times. There is no similar requirement for whites.
52. South Africa: The Fire This Time, NEWSWEEK, July 4, 1976, at 89.
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ently was a spontaneous outburst against racial injustice in South
Africa triggered by the imposition of a requirement that black
high school students take some of their courses in Afrikaans, the
language of white South Africans that symbolizes racial oppression to blacks in that country. 3 Sporadic violence continued
throughout South Africa during 1976 with the death toll reaching
54
approximately 600 for the two months of rioting.
Unrest continued into 1977 with the most notable events occurring in June on the first anniversary of the Soweto riots. On that
day, rioting in the black townships of Kabah and Kwanobuhle in
Cape Province resulted in the death of nine people, seven by police gunfire. 5 In response, the Government of South Africa sought
to stem a growing sense of concern among white South Africans
and to intensify its pressure against leaders of the black community. To accomplish these goals, the Government arrested numerous black leaders, including Steven Biko, leader of the Black Consciousness Movement and one of the foremost advocates of
nonviolent change in South Africa.56 Biko was arrested on September 6, 1977, and died in detention six days later. He was the
forty-sixth apartheid opponent to die mysteriously in detention
over a fifteen-year period. 57 The Government initially reported
that Biko had starved himself to death in a hunger strike, but an
inquest revealed that portions of his skull had been crushed by
four blows to the head.5 8 News of the suspicious circumstances
surrounding Biko's death spread through the international news
media, 59 but it was not until the morning of Biko's funeral6 0 that
white South Africans learned for the first time through the Johannesburg Sunday Express that Biko had died from brain damage and not from a hunger strike. 1
Sharp media criticism of the Government's attempted cover-up
continued until October 19, 1977, when the Government cracked
down on its critics by shutting down two black newspapers, ban-

53. Id.
54. South Africa: Time for Terror? NEWSWEEK, June 27, 1977, at 40.

55. Id.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See D. WOODS, BIKO, 36 (1978).
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 261.
See, e.g., A Tragic Turn to Terrorism, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 10, 1977, at 50.
Approximately 15,000 South African blacks, 30 whites, plus diplomats

from the United States and other nations attended Biko's funeral. Id.
61.

Id.
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ning eighteen civil rights organizations, and arresting scores of
black and white opponents of apartheid. Those arrested included
Percy Qoboza, black editor of The World, the largest black newspaper in the country; Donald Woods, the white editor of The
East London Daily Dispatch; five prominent black and white
churchmen; and dozens of black community leaders.2
B.

Reaction of the United States Congress

On October 25, 1977, Representative Andrew Maguire of New
Jersey introduced H.R. 9746, an amendment to Section 2(b) of
the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945. The proposed amendment
provided that the Bank would be prohibited from making any
loan or participating in any extension of credit to the Republic of
South Africa.63 The bill was modified considerably before it eventually passed both houses of Congress as the Evans Amendment.
Although Representative Maguire set the legislative process in
motion, an examination of the factors that led him to introduce
H.R. 9746 reveals the policy considerations behind the Evans
Amendment.
The most important factor motivating Representative Maguire
to introduce H.R. 9746 was the death of Steven Biko 6 4 Maguire
had visited South Africa as a student in 1962 and was exposed to
a wide spectrum of views on the Government's racial policies by
talking with a large number of South Africans while there. 5
While at the United Nations in the late 1960s, Maguire worked
on ways of limiting aircraft sales to South Africa because of their
potential internal military applications.6 6
After hearing of Biko's death, Representative Maguire assembled approximately fifteen congressmen to call on the South African ambassador to the United States in Washington and urge the
South African Government to allow a full inquiry by international
human rights agencies into Biko's death.6 7 This group of congressmen organized itself as the Ad Hoc Monitoring Group on

62.
63,
64.
(Mar.
65.

The Big Crackdown, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 31, 1977, at 57.
H.R. 9746, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 35,079 (1977).
Interview with former Congressman Andrew Maguire of New Jersey
12, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Maguire interview].
Id.

66. Id.
67.

Id.
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South Africa.6 8

In addition to making a personal appeal to the South African
ambassador to the United States, Maguire favored some kind of
legislative initiative 9 and supported the Collins Resolution's70
strong denunciation of human rights violations in South Africa.
The Collins Resolution urged "the President to take effective
measures against the Republic of South Africa in order to register
the deep concern of the American people about the continued violation of human rights in that country."'1 On October 31, 1977,

the resolution passed the House by an overwhelming majority
-vote of 347 to 54.2 Although it urged "effective measures" by the
President, the Collins Resolution neither contained any specific
recommendations for executive action nor promised any further
congressional action.
Representative Maguire sought to prompt further congressional
action with the introduction of H.R. 9746. During the floor debate
in the House on the Collins Resolution, he mentioned that H.R.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
H.R. Con. Res. 388, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 35,965 (1977).
The full text of the resolution provides:
Whereas the circumstances surrounding the death of Steve Biko on
September 12, 1977, while he was being detained by the Government of
the Republic of South Africa, have aroused deep concrn [sic] among Americans and within the world community; and
Whereas the Government of the Republic of South Africa on October
19, 1977, took a series of repressive measures against black and white opponents of its apartheid policy, including the closing of newspapers, the
outlawing of peaceful religious and social groups, and the detention and
"banning" of South African citizens; and
Whereas these repressive measures represent a serious violation of the
rights of the persons and organizations affected and will further isolate the
Government of the Republic of South Africa as a member of the international community; and
Whereas the United States holds such actions to be unacceptable: Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),

That the Congress strongly denounces the above acts committed by the
Government of the Republic of South Africa which suppress the expression of political thought and violate the rights of the individual, and urges
the President to take effective measures against the .Republic of South Africa in order to register the deep concern of the American people about the
continued violation of human rights in that country.
Id. (emphasis added).
72. See id. at 35,981.
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9746 was designed to terminate Eximbank activity in South Africa. Maguire's proposal that the Eximbank be used as an instrument of United States policy towards South Africa was not a
novel idea. As early as February 2, 1977, the termination of Eximbank activity in South Africa was included in the Congressional Record's list of twenty-two policy options that had been
proposed in an attempt to force the South African Government to
modify its system of apartheid. 73 Representative Maguire viewed
H.R. 9746 as the first step toward this.goal and voiced his support
for a "staged policy" strategy that would apply pressure on the
Government of South Africa for social change through a series of
increasingly stringent steps. 4 The idea of employing a staged policy strategy towards South Africa had originally been introduced
by former United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, during Maguire's years at the United Nations in
5
the late 1960s.7
A key element in the development of a staged policy strategy is
to select a policy option that has a reasonable chance of gaining
congressional approval. Because Congress had never passed any
legislation aimed specifically at applying pressure on South Africa
to change its racial policies prior to the Collins Resolution, Representative Maguire anticipated that it would be difficult to pass
legislation designed to have a substantive impact on South Africa.
In fact, Maguire did not expect that H.R. 9746 would ever be enacted into law, even after the Bill had undergone considerable alteration in committee and on the floor of the House. 6 This expectation appeared to be justified as similar bills sponsored by New
York Representatives Stephen J. Solarz and Charles B. Rangel
failed even to reach the floor of the House. The bills sponsored by
Solarz and Rangel sought to (1) reduce or eliminate the foreign
tax credit allowed to United States corporations unless those corporations followed fair employment principles; 77 (2) direct the
President to issue regulations prohibiting further United States
investment in South Africa until the President determined that
the Government of South Africa had made substantial progress

73. See id. at 35,973 (statement of Rep. Maguire).
74. See id. at 35,967.
75. Maguire interview, supra note 64.
76. Id.

77. See H.R. 12321, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. H11,103 (introduced Apr. 24, 1978, by Rep. Rangel).
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toward ending discrimination and achieving full participation of
all the people of South Africa in the country's social, political,
and economic life,7 and (3) amend the Export Administration
Act to prohibit investors who engaged in unfair employment practices in South Africa from receiving export licenses, entering into
federal contracts, receiving tax credits, or using Eximbank services. 79 Representative Maguire confined the scope of his bill
solely to the activities of the Eximbank in order to make it appear more moderate to Congress, and thus, give it a better chance
of passage.8 0
An important element in the ultimate passage of the Evans
Amendment was the behind-the-scenes role played by the Carter
Administration. The Administration had undertaken unprecedented activity in Namibia l and was hoping for independent
congressional initiative on other issues relating to South Africa. 2
Under existing law, the Administration had the authority to terminate Eximbank activity in South Africa,"3 but independent
congressional action would enable the Administration to assert in
its negotiations with the South African Government that United
States opposition to apartheid was a broadly based sentiment felt
throughout the United States, rather than a concern peculiar to
the Carter Administration. The Administration, therefore, could
intimate that it might be advantageous for the South Africans to
seize the opportunity to seriously negotiate with the Administration rather than risk having Congress impose further restrictions
on relations between South Africa and the United States. 4 Thus,
although the Carter Administration provided no ostensible support for H.R. 9746, and very quietly stated its opposition to the
Bill on the ground that it would remove a valuable bargaining

78. H.R. 13,273, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. H18,822 (introduced
June 23, 1978 by Reps. Diggs, Nix, and Mitchell).
79. H.R. 12463, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. H12,009-10 (introduced
May 1, 1978); H.R. 12464, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. H12001-03 (introduced May 1, 1978); see also 124 CONG. REC. H12,001 (daily ed. May 1, 1978)
(statement by Rep. Solarz explaining the purpose of H.R. 12464).
80. Maguire interview, supra note 64.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.

83. See 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(9) (1982).
84. See 124 CONG. REc. 16,071 (daily ed. June 2, 1978) (statement of Rep.
Tsongas). Representative Tsongas argued for a "unified" United States Government approach toward South African policy.
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chip from the Administration's hands,85 Maguire claims that he
received vital assistance from the Administration through United
Nations Ambassadors Andrew Young and Donald McHenry 6
H.R. 9746 received additional support from an article appearing in the January 1978 issue of Foreign Affairs entitled "South
Africa: What Is To Be Done

'8 7

in which the strategy of a staged

policy or "graduated actions" was clearly articulated. 88 Maguire
claims that this article was helpful in obtaining initial administration and congressional support.8 9
C. The Committee Process
H.R. 9746 did not survive very long as an unconditional prohibition on Eximbank activity in South Africa. During hearings
before the Subcommittee on International Trade, Investment,
and Monetary Policy on February 9, 1978, H.R. 9746 was incorporated into the general authorization bill of the Eximbank ° in the
following amended form:
In no event shall the Bank guarantee, insure, or extend credit or
participate in any extension of credit to the Republic of South Africa unless and until the President determines that significant progress toward majority rule has been made in the Republic of South
Africa and transmits to the congress a statement describing and
explaining the determination. 91
The bil's principal supporter on the subcommittee, Representative Paul Tsongas of Massachusetts, realized that the Bill would
not pass the subcommittee in the form of an unconditional prohibition on Eximbank activity in South Africa. Representative
85. 124 CONG. REC. H16,072 (daily ed. June 2, 1978) (Statement of Rep.
Stanton).
86. Maguire interview, supra note 64.
87. Ferguson & Cotter, South Africa: What is to Be Done? 56 FOREIGN AFF.
253 (1978). C. Clyde Ferguson, Professor of Law at the Harvard Law School
until his death in December 1983, served as U.S. Ambassador to Uganda from
1970 to 1972. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in
1972 and 1973, and U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Economic and Social Council
from 1973 to 1975. William. R. Cotter was President of the African-American
Institute. He also has served as Assistant Attorney General of Northern Nigeria,
1962-63, and as a White House Fellow, 1965-66.
88. Id. at 274.
89. Maguire interview, supra note 64.
90. H.R. 12157, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. 15,942 (1978).
91. Id.
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Tsongas, however, pushed it through the subcommittee with the
above conditional language attached and managed to foil all at92
tempts to further dilute the restrictions imposed by the Bill.
The Bill in this amended form passed the subcommittee by a 10-5
vote.
The amendment to H.R. 9746 encountered greater resistance in
the full Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs. Representative Tsongas reluctantly acceded to another change, substituting the phrase "elimination of apartheid" for "majority
rule."93 By the time the amendment to the Eximbank statute
reached the floor of the House on June 1, 1978, it had been
changed twice, each amendment making South African qualification for Eximbank assistance less difficult. Nevertheless, the
Amendment still required a Presidential determination that significant progress toward the elimination of apartheid had been
made. The definitional standard of the phrase "significant progress," however, will surely vary according to the human rights
policies of future Administrations. Under President Carter, who
strongly supported human rights, the standard would likely have
been stringent; subsequent presidents with less strident concerns
about human rights may set less burdensome standards.
The most important aspect of the Amendment as of June 1,
1978, was that it still tied both public and private access to Eximbank assistance to the conduct of the South African Government. By the end of the first day of the floor debate, however, it
was apparent that the language of the Bill was too strong to attract a majority of votes in the House.9 4 A substitute amendment
was introduced by Representative Thomas B. Evans of Delaware
on June 2, and was approved by a voice vote with only slight
modifications on the same day. 5 The original Evans Amendment
only required private purchasers under subsection (c) to endorse
certain fair employment principles. No reference was made to the
necessity of implementing these principles. Proponents of
stronger language argued that requiring private purchasers to
merely endorse fair employment practices, without more, would
be meaningless and would allow the South African private sector
92.
93.
94.
95.

Maguire interview, supra note 64.
See 124 CONG. REc. 16,059 (1978) (statement of Rep. Tsongas).
See id. at 15,937-42.
See id. at 16,057.
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purchasers to continue business as usual.96 The floor debate
quickly produced a compromise in which a reference to implementation was included in the Amendment.9 7 Even though the
compromise was proposed and agreed to quickly and easily, its
implications were far-reaching. Because the compromise required
implementation to be considered, the State Department was
brought more deeply into the certification process, and thereby,
into conflict with South African law. 8
The most significant difference between the Evans Amendment
and Representative Maguire's bill was that under the Evans
Amendment, access to Eximbank assistance for private purchasers in South Africa was no longer linked to the conduct of the
South African Government. The Evans Amendment enabled private purchasers to be measured against a specific set of fair employment practice standards to determine their eligibility for Eximbank assistance. Because South African companies apparently
could implement the fair employment practices themselves, eligibility for Eximbank support was placed in their own hands.
Proponents of the Evans Amendment suggested that the selfimplementing aspect of the Amendment was a way to encourage
the South African private sector to eliminate apartheid, and
thereby, influence a change in the policies of the South African
Government. More important to some of its proponents, the Evans Amendment kept the Eximbank in South Africa. The proponents of the Amendment apparently thought it highly likely that
private purchasers would be able to meet the certification requirements of subsection (c), while compliance by the South African Government with the standards contained in the Maguire bill
seemed very unlikely. 99
Critics of the Evans Amendment viewed it as an erosion of
most of the positive attributes of H.R. 9746. First, far from being
a blanket prohibition on financial assistance designed to induce
both public and private parties to press for governmental reform,
the Evans Amendment granted the private sector access to Eximbank assistance regardless of the conduct of the South African
Government.10 0 These critics argued that the Amendment pro-

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See, e.g., id. at 16,062 (statement of Rep. Holtzman).
See id. at 16,062-63.
See infra notes 157-70 and accompanying text.
See 124 CONG. REC. 16,060-66 (1978).
See id. at 16,058 (statements of Reps. Evans and Stanton).
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vided little incentive to the private sector to press for governmental change. '1 1 Second, the failure to mention "majority rule" in
the Amendment left doubt as to whether the Congress was sincerely committed to or even tacitly supported majority rule in
10 2
South Africa.
On July 27, 1978, the entire Eximbank authorization bill, including the Evans Amendment, passed the House by a 314-47
margin. 10 3 Despite the fact that the overwhelming support for
passage probably represented support for the extension of the Eximbank's assistance programs throughout the world rather than
strong support for the Evans Amendment, South African newspapers interpreted the passage of the Bill as an indication that both
the President and the Congress of the United States objected to
04
the human rights policies of the South African Government.
D.

Congressional Debate

Although the Evans Amendment differed significantly from
H.R. 9746, congressional debate throughout the entire legislative
process consistently focused on the same issues. The debate became confusing when congressmen opposing any legislation affecting the Eximbank's role in South Africa framed their arguments as though the sole purpose of the proposed legislation was
the withdrawal of United States investments from South Africa
rather than the curtalilment of Eximbank activity there. The opposing congressmen presumably saw divestment as the ultimate
goal of the legislation's proponents and H.R. 9746 as the first step
in achieving that goal. Nevertheless, of the ten issues raised in
debate, only half received any significant attention.
One of the more significant issues raised in the congressional
debate was whether the South African Government had made any
effort toward granting basic human rights to its nonwhite 0 pop101. See id. at 16,058-61.
102. See id. at 16,068-72.
103. See id. at 23,116.
104. Representative Maguire was attending a conference in South Africa at
the time the legislation passed the House. He stated that the news made frontpage headlines in South African newspapers. Maquire interview, supra note 64.

105. The author would have preferred to use a term other than "nonwhite"

to describe the various peoples of South Africa, since "nonwhite" is, in and of
itself, a negative term. The term "black" might have been more appropriate, but

its use in place of "nonwhite" would have lead to considerable confusion in trying to describe the current system of racial classifications under apartheid, cer-
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ulation. The opponents of the legislation argued that if South Africa had been making significant efforts to bring about change as
rapidly as possible, additional pressure through legislation that
affected the Eximbank's role in South Africa would be unnecessary, and any attempts by the United States to hasten the pace
could trigger a political backlash among white South Africans or
even a Marxist revolution by black South Africans. Proponents of
the Eximbank amendments argued that the extent of the racial
and political repression in South Africa had actually increased in
recent years, and if the South African Government was not persuaded to change its policies, the increasing unrest within the
black community could lead to a Marxist revolution.
Only two congressmen 0 6 seemed to believe that South Africa
had been making efforts to improve the basic human rights of its
nonwhite population. Representative Derwinski of Illinois, however, could offer only the following evidence in support of his belief: "South Africa is making social progress as shown by that nation's adoption of the Western-sponsored Namibia plan, its
official endorsement of the 'Sullivan principles,' and the South
African Government's announcement that nonwhites would be
permitted to register in private schools.'10 7 Numerous congressmen responded by arguing that the South African Government
had failed to make any effort at reform and that the Government
actually had enacted even tighter restrictions on political dissent
in recent years while leaving intact laws that compelled racial discrimination. 10 The following facts seem to support the latter
point of view.109
As of the summer of 1978, South African laws compelled racial
discrimination by prohibiting nonwhites from voting or from serving in the Parliament, by requiring race classification documents
or "passbooks" to be carried at all times, by restricting nonwhite
ownership of real property in urban areas and other defined areas, by restricting the kinds of occupations or businesses that
nonwhites could pursue in white areas, by excluding blacks from
the collective bargaining process, and by restricting the right of

tain statistical information, and other data included in the Article.
106. The two were Representative Goldwater and Representative Derwinski.
107. 124 CONG. REc. 16,063 (1978).
108. Representative Mitchell cited a variety of South African laws to point
out the Government's failures. Id. at 16,061-62.
109. See Appendix 1.
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blacks to strike. 110 In addition, the Government compelled the exercise of segregation in public buses and other vehicles, railroads,
public parks and premises, toilets, schools, hospitals and factory
facilities."'South African law also limited political dissent, outlawed communism,1 1 2 banned black political organizations, prohibited demonstrations, imposed broad press censorship, allowed indefinite
detention without trial, permitted government surveillance of
mail and telephone communications, indirectly banned peaceful
boycotts, authorized the confiscation of property belonging to suspicious persons during a state of emergency, authorized cabinet
ministers to withhold evidence in criminal trials if they considered the evidence to be prejudicial to the public security, authorized the judicial acceptance of guilty pleas in certain criminal
cases without requiring any other evidence from the state, and
delegated broad powers to lower-level judicial authorities to take
actions that previously required higher-level approval, thus increasing the speed with which the Government could react to po113
litical dissenters.

In addition to the preceding legislation, considerable evidence
of excesses in the enforcement of legislation also exists. For example, forty-six blacks, including Steven Biko, died while under police detention between 1963 and 1977.114 Twenty-four of these
people died from March 1976 through September 1977,115 and in
1975 and 1976 over 225 nonpolitical detainees died while under
police custody." 6
The issue of whether meaningful efforts had been made to improve the basic human rights status of the nonwhite population
in South Africa was significantly muted as it became increasingly
apparent that conditions for nonwhites had not improved and, in
fact, had probably worsened largely as a result of actions taken by
the South African Government and its agencies. The debate fo110. See id.
111. See id.
112. The South African Government defines communism to include any doc-

trine that is designed to change the status quo in South Africa.
113. See J. JACKSON, JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 26-40 (1980).
114. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
115. D. WOODS, supra note 56, at 6-7.
116. 123 Cong. Ree. 35,966 (1977). Representative Diggs pointed out this fact
during the floor debate on the Collins Resolution. He did not, however, compare
these figures with statistics from prior years.
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cused primarily on determining an appropriate congressional response to the policy of apartheid in South Africa and the role
that the Eximbank should play as an instrument of that response.
First, opponents of Eximbank legislation argued that the Eximbank had been created solely for economic reasons and that
politicizing the Bank would be a mistake. 117 In support of this
argument, Representative Kelly of Florida cited a portion of the
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 which provides, in part, that
"[t]he objects and purposes of the bank shall be to aid in financing and to facilitate exports and imports and the exchange of
commodities between the United States . . . and any foreign
country." 1 " Representative Kelly's point was that the statutory
purpose of the Bank was exclusively economic. Others argued,
however, that the Bank was already politicized. For several years,
transactions with communist countries had been prohibited in the
absence of a presidential determination that a particular transaction would be in the national interest." 9 In addition, since 1977
the Bank had been directed to consider a nation's observance of
and respect for human rights before authorizing loans or guarantees in the country from which the assistance had been
120
requested.
Second, debate focused on whether the proposed legislation
would make South Africa the victim of "selective morality. ' 12 '
Opponents of the Eximbank legislation argued that countries
with human rights records as bad or worse than South Africa's,
including communist countries and a few black-ruled African nations, remained eligible for Eximbank financing support even
though South Africa was excluded. In support of this argument,
Representative Kelly stated:
The bill ... is so totally hypocritical that it defies description. It
provides that South Africa should be precluded from Eximbank
transactions while Eximbank carries on business as usual with an
array of Communist nations....
Communism is the absolute opposite of civil rights, human
rights, dignities, and freedom for all people. And yet the United
States is in the process of dealing with Poland, Romania, Yugosla-

117. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REc. 15,943 (1978) (statement of Rep. Kelly).
118. 12 U.S.C. § 635 (1982).

119. See id. § 635(b)(2)(B).
120. See supra text accompanying note 44.
121. See 124 CONG. REc. 16,063 (1978) (statement of Rep. Derwinski).
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22

Representative Derwinski, agreeing with Representative Kelly,
noted that "Communist governments for the most part deny all
of their citizens of almost all their civil and human rights. In the
Republic of [South] Africa you have a denial for some of the citi1 23
zens of some of their civil rights.'
Proponents of the Eximbank legislation responded by arguing
that among nations which violate human rights, South Africa was
a special case because it was "the only country in the world that
has seen fit to codify and to institutionalize racism as a governing
way of life.' 1 24 Representative McKinney analogized discrimination in South Africa to that in Nazi Germany, saying that the
House could no longer "sit back, as many did prior to the outbreak of World War II, and watch our country support a nation
25
which treats fellow human beings like animals.'
Representative Pease of Ohio argued in favor of using the Eximbank as a vehicle for United States sanctions by pointing out
that twenty-six countries had already been excluded from Eximbank assistance. Restrictions on eighteen of these countries
had been adopted pursuant to the statutory requirement that the
Bank not support transactions with communist countries unless
the President found a transaction to be in the national interest. 26
Restrictions on four of the twenty-six countries had been adopted
because the United States had never granted them diplomatic
recognition.' 27 The remaining four countries, including South Africa, were subject to restrictions because of their records on
human rights.' 28 Three of those countries had been entirely excluded from any Eximbank assistance, although South Africa remained eligible for guarantees lasting no longer than three and
one-half years. 29 This list of countries severely damaged the ar-

122. Id. at 15,943.
123. Id. at 15,945.
124. Id. at 16,061 (remarks of Rep. Pease).
125. Id. at 16,061.
126. The eighteen countries were Albania, Bulgaria, the People's Republic of
China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
North Korea, Vietnam, Outer Mongolia, Tibet, Cuba, the Soviet Union, Cambodia, Laos, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Id. at 16,060.
127. The four countries were Rhodesia, Namibia, Transkei, and Bophuthatswana. Id.
128. The other three were Uganda, Chile, and Uruguay. Id.
129. Id. at 16,060, 16,071 (3
year grace period).
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gument that South Africa was being made the victim of "selective
morality." Nevertheless, Representative Kelly did not retreat
from his assertion that every communist country should be excluded from Eximbank assistance before any noncommunist
country could be excluded. 130
Third, opponents of the Eximbank legislation claimed that
130. See id. at 15,945. Rep. Stephen J. Solarz of New York offered the following insightful analysis into the communist/anticommunist debate in connection with human rights on the floor of the House on October 31, 1977:
Mr. Speaker, I must say that the arguments which we have heard from
my friends on the other side of the aisle, who style themselves as champions of human liberty and freedom, have a strangely false and hollow ring.
They condemn [the Collins] resolution on the grounds that while it criticizes the repressive activities of the Government of South Africa, it says
nothing about the repressive activities of other governments elsewhere on
the continent.
Yet when we passed the resolution a few weeks ago condemning the suppression of human rights in Cambodia, I did not hear them getting up and
arguing against it on the grounds that it should have included references
to the suppression of human rights in the Philippines and in South Korea.
When we passed the resolution a few months ago condemning the repression of human rights in the Soviet Union, I did not hear them argue
against it on the grounds that we should have included references to the
suppression of human rights in Cyprus.
When we passed resolutions over the last several years condemning the
violation of human rights in Cuba, I did not hear them argue against it on
the grounds that it did not refer to the suppression of human rights in
Uruguay and Paraguay.
Why is it that whenever we have a resolution condemning repression by
anti-Communist governments, it is criticized by these gentlemen on the
grounds that it does not include references to the suppression of human
rights by Communist governments; but whenever we have resolutions condemning the suppression of human freedom in Communist regimes, they
say nothing about the fact it fails to refer to the suppression of human
rights in anti-Communist governments. [sic]
The fact of the matter is that those of us who sponsor this resolution are
concerned about the suppression of human rights in Uganda, Burundi, the
Central African Republic, and other repressive regimes in Africa and elsewhere around the world. If those Members who oppose this resolution
want a resolution dealing with repression in other countries let us draw it
up, and let us work for it, but there is nothing in this resolution which
implicitly or explicitly sanctions the suppression of human rights outside
South Africa. What this resolution does is to express the concern of the
Congress over the suppression of human rights in South Africa, and if a
Member is against apartheid, and shares our sense of outrage over the recent events in that country, he ought to vote for this resolution.
123 CONG. REc. 35,922-73 (1977).
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black South Africans would be the first to suffer from the withdrawal of United States corporations from South Africa as economic activity slowed and unemployment increased. 13 1 Proponents of the legislation, however, argued that the legislation was
designed to curtail Eximbank assistance in South Africa, not
cause divestment. These legislators interpreted the willingness of
black South Africans to suffer the threat of prison or death for
their continued political activity as an implicit acceptance of any
additional suffering that might be caused by ending Eximbank
132
activity in South Africa.
Opponents of the legislation also asserted that black leaders in
South Africa were opposed to restrictions on United States investments in South Africa. These legislators repeated statements
made by Chief Buthelezi, the leader of South Africa's five million
Zulus, that divestment would be a "sterile exercise," 13 3 and
quoted black newspaper editor Percy Qoboza, who believed that
the proposed legislation would "create economic chaos and guarantee a full-scale bloody racial confrontation." 1 4 Proponents of
the legislation suggested that Mr. Qoboza and Chief Buthelezi
had made their comments with the knowledge that the South African Government would incarcerate them if they made any provocative statements. In addition, proponents argued that other
people and groups knowledgeable of black opinion in South African such as Donald Woods, Amnesty International, and the
American Committee on Africa, would contradict the assertion
35
that black South Africans opposed divestment.'
Fourth, the legislators debated whether United States business
in general was playing a positive or negative role in South Africa.
Some congressmen believed that United States companies, which
had endorsed and implemented the Sullivan Code of fair employment principles, provided a positive example for South African
corporations. 36 A Senate Report on South Africa published in
January 1978, known as the Clark Report, came to virtually the
same conclusion, stating that United States corporations in South

131.

See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. at 16,063 (1978) (statement of Rep.

Derwinski).
132. See id. at 16,062 (statement of Rep. Downey).
133. Id. at 16,058 (statement by Rep. Evans quoting Chief Buthelezi).

134. Id. (quoting Percy Qoboza).
135. See id. at 16,071 (statement of Rep. Maguire).

136. See id. at 16,063 (statement of Rep. Fenwick).

19841

EXPORT-IMPORT BANK

Africa were moving "in the direction of a socially responsible...
role, 137 but had not reached the point at which their current role
could be characterized as socially responsible. Furthermore, the
Clark Report asserted that the net effect of United States investment in South Africa had been "to strengthen the economic and
military self-sufficiency of South Africa's apartheid regime." 138
It is important to note, however, that the purpose of the Eximbank legislation was not to divest United States investment in
South Africa, but rather to restrict the role of the Eximbank in
assisting United States exports to South Africa. The intent of the
Evans Amendment was not to change the conduct of United
States corporations in South Africa. In fact, virtually all of the
purchasers benefiting from Eximbank assistance had been South
African-based firms, not subsidiaries of United States corporations. 1 9 Thus, an issue largely overlooked during the congressional debate was whether South African corporations could possibly be forced to play a constructive role in implementing fair
employment practices when those fair employment practices
would violate both discriminatory employment laws 140 and deeply
ingrained traditions of discrimination.
Fifth, the debate on the floor of the House raised the issue of
the effect on United States businesses if South African purchasers
found alternative suppliers in Europe and Japan, where governmental financing support to purchasers in South Africa was still
available. Opponents of the legislation were concerned that if
South African purchasers could find alternate sources of financing
in other countries, the termination of Eximbank activity in South
Africa would hurt only United States industry and employment.
Sixth, the debate focused limited attention on four ancillary issues, including South Africa's role as an ally to the United States
in World War I, World War II, and the Korean War, and the
United States vulnerability to a retaliatory embargo on strategic
metals available only in South Africa and the Soviet Union. The
congressional debates did not delve into these issues in any detail.
The short time spent discussing these issues implies that South
Africa's role as a war ally was not a mitigating factor in the
137.

S. REP. No. 779, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13.

138. Id.
139. Subsidiaries or branches of United States corporations have made less
than 2% of the dollar volume of purchases. See Eximbank Data, supra note 32.
140. See supra text accompanying note 108.
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United States opposition to apartheid and there apparently was
little concern that passage of legislation prohibiting Eximbank assistance in South Africa would produce a retaliatory response
from the South African Government.
A few members of Congress were concerned that trade sanctions placed on South Africa might negatively affect neighboring
nations that traded with South Africa and a portion of whose citizens work in South Africa.14 1 Congressional debate did not really
cover this issue, presumably because the termination of Eximbank activity was not expected to have a significant effect on
neighboring nations.
The fourth ancillary issue, raised by Representative Tsongas,
was the legislation's possible effect on the broad strategic interests of the United States in Africa. Representative Tsongas was
hopeful that African cooperation in the United States efforts to
eradicate Cuban intervention in Ethiopia, Angola, and other African countries would be associated with an aggressive United
States policy toward South African reform by governments of
other African nations. He pointed out that when President Carter
went to Nigeria to discuss the Cuban intervention, the Nigerians2
14
wanted instead to discuss the racial problems of South Africa.
Representative Tsongas believed that sensitivity to the views of
Nigeria 14 3 and other African countries should be an important
foundation for United States foreign policy in Africa.
E.

Statutory Construction

The Evans Amendment added the following section to the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (the "Act"):
In no event shall the Bank guarantee, insure, or extend credit or
participate in the extension of credit (a) in support of any export
which would contribute to enabling the Government of the Republic of South Africa to maintain or enforce apartheid; (b) in support
of any export to the Government of the Republic of South Africa
or its agencies unless the President determines that significant progress toward the elimination of apartheid has been made and
transmits to the Congress a statement describing and explaining
141.
Malawi,
142.
143.

124 CONG. REC. 15,943 (1978) (statement of Rep. Kelly). Lesotho,
Mozambique, and Swaziland were most seriously considered. Id.
Id. at 16,059-60.
Especially because Nigeria is the second biggest exporter of oil to the

United States.
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that determination; or (c) in support of any export to other purchasers in the Republic of South Africa unless the United States
Secretary of State certifies that the purchaser has endorsed and
has proceeded toward the implementation of the following principles: nonsegregation of the races in all work facilities; equal and
fair employment for all employees; equal pay for equal work for all
employees; initiation and development of training programs to prepare nonwhite South Africans for supervisory, administrative, clerical, and technical jobs; increasing the number of nonwhites in
management and supervisory positions; a willingness to engage in
collective bargaining with labor unions; and improving the quality
of life for employees in such areas as housing, transportation,
44
schooling, recreation, and health facilities.
Subsection (a) prohibits financing support for any export
"which would contribute to enabling the Government of the Republic of South Africa to maintain or enforce apartheid.' 1 4 5 Presumably, this language was meant to cover exports such as computers or other equipment that the South African Government
could use to implement its pass laws or to assist the police in
their control of the nonwhite population. This subsection, however, arguably applies to any commercial transaction with South
Africa on the premise that such transactions contribute to the economic prosperity of South Africa and, thereby, financially and
politically strengthen the position of the South African Govern-

ment enabling it to maintain and enforce its policy of apartheid.
The former interpretation is probably closer to what Congress intended, otherwise it would simply have imposed a blanket ban on
all Eximbank financing in South Africa. During the debate on the
floor of the House of Representatives, Representative Thomas B.
Evans of Delaware, the sponsor of the amendment, elaborated on
the purpose of subsection (a):
The intent [of subsection (a)] is to just codify the U.N. embargo
that was adopted by the U.N. Assembly and supported by this
country in 1977 which prohibited support for such things as military assistance, which is and was rather specific.
So the intent is not at all to prohibit any form of guarantee or
credit to those things that are not directly related to the military
146
or the police.

144. 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(9) (1982).
145. Id. § 635(b)(9)(a).
146.

124 CONG. REc. 16,067 (1978).
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Subsection (b) prohibits the "support of any export to the Government of the Republic of South Africa or its agencies unless
the President [of the United States] determines that significant
progress toward the elimination of apartheid has been made and
transmits to the Congress a statement describing and explaining
that determination.

'147

An issue raised during the floor debate

was whether the word "agencies" as used in the Amendment covered quasi-governmental or parastatal corporations such as ISCOR, the government-controlled Iron and Steel Corporation, and
ESCOM, the government-owned electric utility. Representative
Evans attempted to clarify the meaning of the term by stating
that "if there is a quasi-governmental entity involved, it would in
my estimation be covered. '148 The prohibitions embodied in subsection (b) may be more significant than Congress envisioned at
the time of its passage. Data provided by the Eximbank revealed
that the volume of Eximbank-supported exports to South African
parastatals was considerably higher than testimony in the con149
gressional hearings indicated.

Subsection (c) will receive the bulk of attention in this Article.
This provision prohibits exports to private purchasers in "South
Africa unless the United States Secretary of State certifies that
the purchaser has endorsed and has proceeded toward the implementation of" certain fair employment practices.1 50 A purchaser
in South Africa wishing to receive financing support from the Eximbank must prove to the United States mission in South Africa
that it has established complete nonsegregation of employees and
equal opportunities in the areas of pay and advancement. The
purchaser must also show that efforts have been made to negotiate with existing labor unions; that training for supervisory and
technical jobs has been provided to nonwhites; and that the quality of life has been improved for its employees in the areas of
housing, transportation, schooling, recreation, and health
facilities.

151

In order to perform its certification functions, the State Department designed a questionnaire to be completed by any purchaser located in South Africa that requested Eximbank assis147. 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(9)(B) (emphasis added).
148. 124 CONG. REC. 16,059 (1978).
149. See infra text accompanying notes 193-95.

150. 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(9)(C).
151. Id.
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tance. 152 The eight-page questionnaire provided the South
African purchaser with an opportunity to endorse the employment practices described in subsection (c) and to outline in specific terms the measures it had taken to implement those practices within the last two years. Completed questionnaires were
submitted to and evaluated by the United States Embassy in Pretoria. If the application appeared to meet the requirements for
certification, the United States Embassy forwarded it to the
United States mission for further evaluation, which included, "inter alia, on-site visits, employee interviews, and discussions with
labor organizations and other interested groups and individu-

als.1'153 The United States Embassy, using the questionnaire and
information garnered from its investigation, prepared a recommendation for the State Department regarding certification. The
State Department conducted "its own review of the case in light
of the Embassy's report, including appropriate interagency and
other consultations, and prepare[d] a final recommendation to
' '15
the Secretary of State or his delegate. 4
If the Secretary of State rejected the application for certification, "or if the U.S. Embassy notifle[d] the Department that a
purchaser [had] not complied with certification requirements, the
Export-Import Bank will be so advised by the Department, and
the U.S. applicant for Export-Import Bank support in turn will
be informed by the bank that it cannot proceed with the application."15' 5 The United States Embassy transmitted the State Department's final decision to the South African purchaser and the
Eximbank at the same time.
When the Secretary of State accepted the application, the
South African purchaser was certified for all transactions arising
during a twelve-month period beginning on the date the Eximbank was notified of certification. Even though a South African
purchaser has been certified, each individual transaction must
qualify for Eximbank financing support under the Bank's normal
operating procedures. In addition, the State Department's procedures require purchasers to submit annually a new application for
certification. The annual certification application is evaluated

152. The questionnaire is reproduced infra Appendix 2 [hereinafter cited as
State Department Questionnaire].
153. Id. Explanation of Certification Process.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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against the purchaser's past record. The continuing certification
process is designed to insure that South African purchasers receiving Eximbank assistance maintain a minimum level of fair
employment practices and continue to make sustained progress
beyond that minimum level. 156

IV.
A.

EFFECTS OF THE EVANS AMENDMENT

Eximbank Activity in South Africa Since the Evans
Amendment

The Bank has not financed a single transaction in South Africa
since the Evans Amendment was incorporated into the ExportImport Bank Act in November 1978.157 The State Department
took roughly one year to devise the questionnaire for South African purchasers. Since the questionnaire was developed, however,
the State Department has neither approved nor rejected the applications that it received for Eximbank financing support. 5 8 By
January 1982, only four South African companies had applied for
Eximbank support. Their applications were forwarded from the
United States Embassy in Pretoria to the State Department, but
1 59
the State Department had refused to act on the applications.
As of January 1982, the Embassy in Pretoria had advised another
fifteen to twenty potential applicants to hold on to their applications. 60 The reason for the State Department's refusal to process
the applications of South African purchasers stems from the passage of the Protection of Businesses Act by the South African
Parliament on June 20, 1978.161
The Protection of Businesses Act (the Act) provides that, except with the permission of the Minister of Economic Affairs, "no
person shall in compliance with any order, direction or letters of
request issued or emanating from outside the Republic, furnish
any information as to any business whether carried on in or

156. Id.
157. Interview with James Moriarty, Economic Officer of Southern Africa
Office, U.S. State Department (Jan. 1982) (Supplemented by interview with
Emile Skodon, Mr. Moriarty's replacement (Feb. 15, 1984)).
158. Id.

159. Id.
160. Id.

161. Protection of Businesses Act, No. 99 of 1978, amended by Protection of
Businesses Amendments Act, No. 114 of 1979, infra Appendix 3.
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outside the Republic."' 2 Under the Act, the provision of any information about a South African business to a foreign country
without prior approval of the Minister of Economic Affairs is a
criminal offense. Whether the legislation applies only to governmental requests for information or any request, public or private,
is unclear from the language of the Act.
According to Representative Maguire, members of the House of
Representatives were not aware of this South African legislation
during the debate and voting on the Evans Amendment. 6 3 Because the Protection of Businesses Act was passed only eighteen
days after the Evans Amendment had been approved by a voice
vote on the floor of the House, only a very close monitoring of the
legislative process in South Africa could have put members of the
House on notice that the reporting requirements of the Evans
Amendment might conflict with a proposed South African law.
Nevertheless, the South African Parliament passed the Act more
than a month before the House approved the entire Eximbank
authorization bill, which included the Evans Amendment. Thus,
if members of the House had been aware of the Protection of
Businesses Act and had identified the potential conflict between
the Act and the Evans Amendment, they presumably could have
altered the Evans Amendment to avoid the conflict.
Representative Maguire's own impression was that the intent of
the Act was to limit the information that South African companies could legally supply to the Sullivan organization, the group
responsible. for monitoring those South African companies that
endorsed the Sullivan principles.""' In July 1978, the Sullivan organization first asked for semiannual reports from the companies
that endorsed the principles of the organization"6 after it had received considerable criticism that those companies were not actually implementing the Sullivan principles, but instead, were using
them as public relations tools to escape closer scrutiny.' 6 It is
entirely possible that the South African Government passed the
Protection of Businesses Act in anticipation of stricter reporting
162. Id. § 1(1)(b).
163. Maguire interview, supra note 64.
164. Id.
165. Dresser Industries and South Africa, Graduate School of Business,
Stanford University, casebook series, 8 (1980) (distributed by HBS Case Services, Harvard Business School, Boston, Mass.)
166. MYERs, supra note 15, at 94.
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requirements of the Sullivan organization.
It is also possible, however, that the South African Government
passed the Act to prevent reporting to the State Department
under the Evans Amendment. This argument is particularly plausible for two reasons. First, nationalistic sentiment is more easily
aroused when a foreign government requests information from
domestic corporations than when a private organization requests
information from foreign multinational corporations. Applying
this general principle to the South African situation, because the
Evans Amendment requires information from South African domestic corporations while the Sullivan reporting requirements
only apply to United States corporations with branches or subsidiaries in South Africa, the South African Parliament may have
been responding to nationalistic sentiment when it passed the
legislation. Indeed, the extraterritorial application of United
States law has been a source of discord between the United States
Government and the governments of some of its trading
167
partners.
Second, an obvious possibility is that the Act was clearly
designed to prevent reporting under the Evans Amendment in order to conceal details of the employment conditions for nonwhites
in South African corporations and, thereby avoid further criticism
and embarrassment to those companies and to the South African
Government. Because the Sullivan requirements only apply to
United State multinational corporations doing business in South
Africa, South African companies did not need any legislation to
conceal employment details from the Sullivan organization.
Whatever the reasons for passing the Protection of Businesses
Act, its effect was to halt the State Department's certification
process. As mentioned above, by the summer of 1982 the State
Department had refused to act on any applications for certification or even reveal the identities of the companies that had applied for certification, ostensibly because those companies would
become immediately subject to criminal prosecution under the
Protection of Businesses Act.""8 The question remains, however, if
the State Department refused to release the applicant companies'
names in order to protect them from criminal prosecution, why
did nineteen to twenty-four South African corporations submit
applications for certification under the Evans Amendment in the
167. See infra text accompanying notes 221-29.
168. Interview with James Moriarity (Jan. 1982).
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first place with full knowledge that submission of such applications could lead to criminal prosecution? This unanswered question raises doubts about the State Department's reason for refusing to act on the certification applications and will be addressed
later in the Article.
Nevertheless, the combined overall effect of the Evans Amendment and the Protection of Businesses Act has been the termination of all Eximbank activity in South Africa, 169 a result ironically
similar to what would have been achieved if Congress had enacted
H.R. 9746. Thus, although the entire legislative process made the
continued Eximbank presence in South Africa more and more
likely as evidenced by the bill's metamorphosis from an unconditional prohibition to a prohibition conditioned on the South African Government's progress toward majority rule, to a prohibition
conditioned on the elimination of apartheid, and, finally, to a prohibition conditioned on the South African purchaser's endorsement and implementation of certain fair employment practices,
the final Evans Amendment produced a result that was contrary
to what the legislators expected. The total absence of Eximbank
activity from South Africa represents a victory for the supporters
of H.R. 9746, even if the legislation itself did not. Recent developments, however, may eventually lead to renewed activity of the
Eximbank in South Africa, a topic treated later in the Article. 170
B.

The Corporate Players

In order to assess accurately the impact of the Evans Amendment on trade between the United States and South Africa, it is
helpful to analyze the trade that historically has been supported
by the Eximbank. A profile of United States users of Eximbank
facilities in South Africa is the first requirement for an accurate
assessment.
From the Bank's inception until the passage of the Evans
Amendment, at least 125 United States companies have used Eximbank facilities to support the purchase of their exports in
South Africa.17 1 The total dollar amount of authorizations approved by the Bank during this period was $603.3 million.1 2 With
the exception of a direct loan for $19.6 million in 1952, all of
169. Interview with Emile Skodon (Feb. 15, 1984).
170. See infra text accompanying and following notes 230-31.
171. See Eximbank Data, supra note 32.

172. Id.
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these authorizations were in the form of guarantees or insurance. 7 3 In addition, only eight percent of the Eximbank activity
in South Africa took place prior to 1971; eighty percent of the
Bank's total dollar volume of authorizations were made during
the years 1971 through 1975 inclusive. 1 4 It is apparent from these
figures that the use of the Bank's facilities for exports to South
Africa was a fairly recent development with concentrated activity
occurring in the early and mid-1970s. As discussed earlier, the increased Eximbank activity was the direct result of the Nixon Administration's decision in 1971 to open the Bank's discount loan
guarantee program to South African purchasers and to increase
the maximum term of Eximbank assistance for exports to South
1 75
Africa from five to ten years.

Although 125 United States corporations have used the Bank's
facilities, the activity among these companies has by no means
been evenly distributed. The top five users of Eximbank assistance were Wean United, General Motors, Boeing, Westinghouse,
and General Electric.117 These five corporations accounted for

forty-two percent of the Bank's authorizations, with Wean United
alone accounting for 10.5 percent of the Bank's total authorizations to South Africa. 17 7 The top ten, top twenty, and top thirty
corporate users of Eximbank financial support respectively accounted for fifty-eight percent, seventy-four percent, and eightyone percent of the Bank's total authorizations. 178 Thus, although
the Eximbank's activity in South Africa involved 125 corporations, the vast majority of authorizations were limited to a very
small group. This pattern of concentration is apparently not atypical of Eximbank activity in other nations.17 9 Table 2 lists the top
thirty exporters, the number of transactions in which each received Eximbank financing support, and the total dollar volume
of authorizations.

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
United

Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
See Eximbank Data, supra note 32.
Id.
Id.
Interview with Steven Glazer, Counsel, Export-Import Bank of the
States (Mar. 29, 1982).
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TABLE 2180
EXIMBANK AUTHORIZATIONS TO SOUTH AFRICA BY UNITED
STATES EXPORTER

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Company
Wean United, Inc.
General Motors
Boeing Company
Westinghouse
General Electric Co.
Mesta Machine Co.
Caterpillar
Turbopower & Marine Systems, Inc.
Marion Power Shovel Co.
Unit Rig & Equipment Co.
Bucyrus-Erie Co.
Export Credit Corp.
Herr-Voss Corp.
United Engineering & Foundry Co.
International Harvester
Piper Aircraft Corp.
Monarch Machine Tool
Motorola, Inc.
Mack Trucks, Inc.
Cessna
Harnischfeger Corp.
Wabco Trade Co.
Leeds & Northrup Co.
Lilliston Corp.
Tozer Kemsley & Milbourn
National Mine Service Co.
Cincinnati Milacron Co.
Dresser Industries
J.I. Case Co.
Eaton Yale & Towne, Inc.

Number of
Transactions

Total
Authorizations

29
8
1
18
4
8
2
1
5
2
3
46
4
2
5
6
6
3
5
12
5
1
5
3
1
11
2
5
5
2

$64,176,900
$55,786,860
$49,500,000
$46,255,000
$40,137,000
$28,549,900
$24,950,000
$16,757,479
$15,058,906
$14,527,400
$14,191,900
$13,883,567
$11,492,500
$11,340,000
$ 9,158,400
$ 7,951,612
$ 7,774,142
$ 6,754,000
$ 5,884,400
$ 5,761,354
$ 5,413,800
$ 5,265,000
$ 4,596,007
$ 4,420,000
$ 3,920,000
$ 3,875,330
$ 3,662,900
$ 3,561,845
$ 3,420,700
$ 3,383,400

Another characteristic of Eximbank financing support in South
Africa is the extent to which United States companies have relied
on Bank-supported transactions in South Africa as a major element of their business strategy. One way of measuring this level
of reliance is to determine the frequency with which each company received Eximbank financing support. The data indicates
that only 37 of the 125 companies used the Bank's services more

180.

See Eximbank Data, supra note 32.
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than twice,""l indicating that the typical user either does not
trade frequently with South Africa or only occasionally uses the
Bank in its South African business.
Another way of measuring the level of reliance on the Eximbank is to determine the time span over which companies received authorizations. Of the 125 companies, only 25 sought financing support from the Bank for a transaction more than two
years after any prior transaction with the Bank.18 2 Most users,
therefore, either used the Bank's services only once or financed a
number of South African transactions in a short period of time.
Again, the figures imply either that business with South Africa is
an infrequent occurrence for most of the 125 companies or that
the use of Eximbank financing support is relied upon only very
infrequently for South African transactions.
Whichever of the two implications is correct, both suggest that
most United States corporations conducting business in South
Africa did not strongly rely on continued Eximbank activity, even
though a few, such as Wean United, used the Bank's facilities as a
major part of their South African business strategy. It is difficult
to argue, however, that continued access to Eximbank financing
was a major underpinning of the business strategy for most
United States corporations in South Africa.
The second requirement for accurately assessing the effect of
the Evans Amendment is to profile the South African purchasers
who were beneficiaries of the Eximbank financing support. In
many ways the profile of the purchasers resembles that of the exporters. Approximately 135 purchasers used the Bank's facilities
between the time the Bank first entered South Africa and the
passage of the Evans Amendment." 3 The proportionate activity
among these South African companies, however, was even less
equally distributed than the activity among the United States
exporters.

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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TABLE 318

EXIMBANK AUTHORIZATIONS TO SOUTH AFRICA BY PURCHASER
Rank Purchaser(s)
1
2
3
4
5
6

ISCOR
South African
Railways
Barlow Rand, Ltd.
ESCOM
Purchasers of
aircraft
Mining Sector

Totals

Number of
Transactions

Total
Authorizations

Authorizations
as % of Total

88
3

$235,333,402
$109,750,000

3&.8

6
15
47

$ 51,464,000
$ 46,688,672
$ 26,823,037

8.5
7.7
4.4

30

$ 24,760,523

4.1

189

$494,819,634

81.6

18.1

As illustrated in table 3, the greatest user of Eximbank financing support was the Iron and Steel Corporation of South Africa
(ISCOR), which accounted for authorizations totalling $235.3 million or a staggering 38.8 percent of all Eximbank authorizations in
South Africa.18 5 ISCOR's transactions included all the Bank-supported transactions of Wean United, ninety-five percent of the
Bank-supported transactions of Westinghouse, seventy-one percent of the Bank-supported transactions of General Electric, and
one hundred percent of the transactions of Mesta Machine Company, the sixth largest recipient of support among United States
exporters.'
The second largest user of Eximbank financing support was South African Railways, which accounted for authorizations totalling $109.7 million or 18.1 percent of all authorizations,
including eighty-seven percent of all General Motors' Bank-supported transactions in South Africa. 187 South African Railway'stotal also included a $49.5 million guarantee covering the sale of a
jumbo jet, the one Bank-supported transaction that the Boeing
Company made in South Africa.' 8 8 The Electricity Supply Company of South Africa (ESCOM) ranks as the fourth largest user of
Eximbank financing support with authorizations totalling $46.7
million or 7.7 percent of all the Bank's South African authorizations, including a $19.6 million direct loan, the only one ever
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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made to South Africa. 189 Together these three purchasers accounted for $391.7 million or 64.6 percent of all Eximbank authorizations in South Africa. Not only does this figure represent an
extraordinarily high concentration of Eximbank activity in a few
purchasers, it also represents an equally high concentration of activity in purchasers that are parastatal corporations.
ISCOR is a government-controlled corporation that produces
approximately seventy-three percent of South Africa's iron and
steel.'9 0 ESCOM is also a parastatal corporation that supplies approximately eighty percent of South Africa's* electrical energy
needs.' 9' South African Railways, which also operates South African Airways, is the country's main supplier of rail and air transportation. 9 2 These three parastatal corporations each represent
strategic sectors of the South African economy that have been
promoted by the South African Government in its attempts to
accelerate the country's economic development. The success of
these parastatals is also vital to South Afri~a's goal of attaining
self-sufficiency, a goal designed to enable South Africa to insulate
itself from possible economic sanctions stemming from its racial
policies. Whether the Eximbank, as an agency of the United
States Government, should have allowed nearly two-thirds of its
financing services in South Africa to be used in the furtherance of
that goal is highly questionable. Under the Evans Amendment,
Eximbank transactions with parastatal corporations are barred
under subsection (b) regardless of their employment practices.
If Congress had chosen to make fair employment practices the
criterion for determining eligibility for Eximbank financing support instead of evaluating the governmental progress toward the
elimination of apartheid, these parastatals probably would still be
among the organizations least likely to qualify. As governmentcontrolled corporations, the parastatals could be expected to implement the Government's discriminatory employment laws as
rigidly as, if not more rigidly than, private corporations. The historical role of the Eximbank in South Africa can be questioned
not only because of the assistance the Bank has provided to the
South African Government for developing strategic industries

189. Id.
190. Hearing, supra note 36, at 64 (statement of Edgar Lockwood, Executive
Director, Washington Office on Africa).
191. Id.
192. Interview with James G. Cook, Boeing Co. (Mar. 29, 1982).
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that the Government considered vital to the attainment of selfsufficiency, and thus, maintenance of the apartheid policies, but
also with respect to the employment practices within those
industries.
In the subcommittee hearing on H.R. 9746, testimony clearly
showed that members of Congress knew that the Eximbank was
providing financial support to South African parastatal corporations, but the magnitude of the support, especially with regard to
purchases by ISCOR, was greatly underestimated. Testimony
before the subcommittee indicated that during the years 1971
through 1976, Eximbank authorizations to ISCOR totalled $76
million. 1 93 The actual level of authorizations during this period
was nearly three times that amount.I9 4 The testimony also grossly
understated the role of the parastatal corporations in the South
African economy. It is reasonably safe to assume, therefore, that
opponents of the blanket ban on Eximbank activity in South Africa proposed by H.R. 9746 believed that subsection (c) of the
Evans Amendment would enable the bulk of Eximbank activity
to continue through private sector purchasers who met the subsection's fair employment standards. In reality, however, private
sector purchasers historically represented only 35.4 percent of Eximbank activity in South Africa-less than ISCOR alone. 9 5 In
addition, the fair employment standards of subsection (c) posed
unexpected legal difficulties for South African purchasers.
The largest user of Eximbank financing support among private
sector purchasers was Barlow Rand, Ltd., a major industrial company in South Africa. Barlow Rand benefited from guarantees totalling $51.5 million or 8.5 percent of all Eximbank authorizations, thus placing it third overall among purchasers.9 6 Barlow
Rand's purchases consisted entirely of walking draglines and
earth-moving equipment. Other than Barlow Rand, the Eximbank did not support any dominant private sector purchasers
of exports.
A further categorization of purchasers in the private industrial
sector is illuminating. Sales of light civilian aircraft and aircraft
equipment were made to a total of twenty South African purchasers. Authorizations supporting these sales totalled $26.8 million or
193.
194.
195.
196.

Hearing,supra note 36, at 64 (statement of Edgar Lockwood).
See supra text accompanying note 185.
See Eximbank Data, supra note 32.
Id.
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4.4 percent of all authorizations. 197 Civilian aircraft sales aroused
special interest in the congressional subcommittee hearing because of concerns about their potential police and military applications. 198 Nothing in the names of the twenty purchasers indicated that they were government-controlled agencies, nor is the
author aware of any connections between these purchasers and
the police or military. Nevertheless, the two greatest purchasers
of civilian aircraft were Placo Aircraft, Ltd., with Eximbank financing support totalling more than $6.1 million for five transactions, and United Air Service, with financing support totalling
more than $5.5 million for ten transactions.199 The major United
States exporters in aircraft transactions were Piper Aircraft Corporation, the Cessna Aircraft Company, and Rockwell International, with guarantees totalling more than $7.6 million, $5.7 million, and $2.2 million, respectively. 00
The mining industry is another significant South African industrial sector that has benefited from Eximbank activity. Nine companies in the mining industry made purchases with authorizations
totalling $24.8 million, or 4.1 percent of all authorizations.20 1 The
relatively limited Eximbank activity in this sector is somewhat
surprising, considering the tremendous importance of the mining
industry in the South African economy. The major United States
exporters to the mining sector were International Harvester, the
National Mine Service Company, the Harnischfeger Company,
the Joy Manufacturing Company and Dresser Industries which
received authorizations totalling more than $5.2 million, $3.8 million, $3.6 million, $2.6 million, and $1.5 million, respectively. 2
The Eximbank was considerably less active in the computer
sector where total authorizations were less than $8.6 million, 03
$6.3 million of which was already included in the total authorizations made to ESCOM. 204 The exporters were Leeds & Northrup

Company and Honeywell, with authorizations totaling more than
$4.5 million and $1.7 million, respectively. 20 5 Major purchasers in197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
See Hearing, supra note 36, at 64 (statement of Edgar Lockwood).
See Eximbank Data, supra note 32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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cluded a Burroughs subsidiary in South Africa and a pharmaceutical company, each receiving guarantees totalling roughly $1 million.0 s Sales of computers and computer equipment were of
special interest in the congressional subcommittee hearings because of their potential applications to police information
processing, particularly in connection with the influx control laws
of South Africa's apartheid system. Critics have questioned
whether adequate safeguards can be established to insure that
computer exports are not used by the South African police
7
20

force.

In summary, the activity of the Eximbank in South Africa can
be characterized as highly concentrated on a few exporters and
purchasers, and directed towards essential industrial sectors of
the South African economy. In addition, parastatal corporations
have been the dominant South African purchasers. Because the
number of participants has been so limited, determining the actual effects of the Evans Amendment on individual companies
lends itself to a survey analysis. The next section chronicles the
survey analysis undertaken by the author.
C. The Impact On United States Exporters
The author assembled a profile of the users of Eximbank financing support in South Africa, and conducted a survey of the
thirty 08 United States exporters with the highest dollar value of
exports to South Africa. The purpose of the survey was to determine what effects, if any, the passage of the Evans Amendment
had on United States exporters doing business in South Africa.
The thirty companies surveyed have represented eighty-one percent of the Bank's business in South Africa and, thus, in the aggregate, provide data from which generalizations can be drawn.
The questionnaire0 9 contained three parts. The first two parts
206. Id.
207. See MYERS, supra note 15, at 2.
208. Actually, 29 of the top 30 exporters were surveyed. The Wabco Trade
Co. (Westinghouse Air and Brake Company Trade Co.) was omitted from the
survey because its response presumably would have been the same as that of
Westinghouse.
209. The questionnaire is not particularly sophisticated nor elaborate, but
the author felt that additional questions might jeopardize the response rate. The
actual survey questionnaire that was sent to the United States exporters read as
follows:
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were designed to determine if the Eximbank withdrawal actually
affected each company's volume of exports to South African purchasers. The third part attempted to determine if the Evans
Amendment caused any change in corporate employment practices in South Africa.
Thirteen of the thirty companies responded to the survey. Of
the thirteen responding, General Motors and Westinghouse stated
that, as a matter of policy, they would not disclose the kind of
data requested in the survey. An officer of Motorola, whose three
Bank-supported transactions were authorized in 1973, stated
QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE EFFECTS OF THE
EVANS AMENDMENT
1. Before the Evans Amendment was passed (November, 1978), did
your company plan to seek financing support from Eximbank for any
transactions in South Africa during 1979, 1980, 1981, or 1982 or none of
these years? (Circle the appropriate response.)
If you circled one or more of the years above, in which of the following
ways has the Amendment altered your company's plans? (Circle the appropriate response or responses.)
A. We applied but the application has not been acted upon because our purchaser in South Africa has not yet received approval
from the U.S. State Department.
B. We have found alternative sources for loan guarantees or credit
insurance and have gone ahead with our planned transactions using
these sources.
C. We have been forced to forego some business opportunities
because alternative means of acquiring loan guarantees or insurance
were either unavailable or too expensive.
D. We decided to go through with transactions without loan guarantees or insurance.
E. Other. (Please explain.)
If you circled B above, please state the source(s) by type that your company has used for alternative financing support (e.g. commercial bank, insurance company, etc.).If you circled C above, can you give an estimate of
the cost to your company in lost business in terms of gross revenues.
2. Do you know of any instances in which your company has been placed
at a significant competitive disadvantage because foreign governmental
agencies supply your non-U.S. competitors with low-cost financing support
in South Africa without restrictions similar to the Evans Amendment? If
yes, please explain.
3. Did the Evans Amendment influence any decisions on the part of
your company to maintain, change, or upgrade the employment conditions
for nonwhite workers employed by your company in South Africa or employed by a purchaser in South Africa of exports from your company? If
yes, please explain.
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that, to the best of his knowledge, Motorola had never sought financial support from the Eximbank for any transactions in South
Africa. The following ten companies actually returned a completed questionnaire or equivalent information: Wean United, the
Boeing Company, the Mesta Machine Company, Bucyrus-Erie,
the Export Credit Corporation, the Piper Aircraft Corporation,
Mack Trucks, the Harnischfeger Corporation, Cincinnati Milacron, and a company ("Company A") that requested anonymity.
Company A and the first three companies listed, Wean United,
the Boeing Company, and the Mesta Machine Company, were
among the top ten users of the Eximbank in South Africa; the
second four were among the top twenty. Harnischfeger ranked
twenty-first and Cincinnati Milacron ranked twenty-seventh. Although it would be difficult to claim conclusive results from a survey of the ten responding companies, the data does provide reliable indications of the patterns developing in South Africa because
the nine2 10 companies surveyed accounted for more than $193
million or thirty-two percent of all Eximbank authorizations
made in South Africa.
Piper Aircraft and Cincinnati Milacron reflected the typical
United States exporter's pattern of occasional use of Eximbank
financing support. 21 Both companies stated that before the passage of the Evans Amendment, they had no plans to seek financing support from the Bank between 1979 and 1982 inclusive. The
other eight companies stated that they had planned to use the
Bank's services for transactions in South Africa before the Evans
Amendment was adopted.
The most striking fact about the responses of the eight companies that had planned operations in South Africa with Bank support was that only one, the Export Credit Corporation, the
United States subsidiary of a British firm, claimed that it had lost
business opportunities because alternative means of acquiring
loan guarantees or insurance were either unavailable or too expensive. The Export Credit Corporation estimated that it had lost
$10 million in gross revenues from foregone business opportunities. Company A indicated in a separate letter that business interruptions due to changes in sources of financing between it and
Barlow Rand had been the result of Barlow Rand's ability to receive credit support from government agencies of other nations in
210. Company A's totals had to be excluded to preserve their anonymity.
211. See supra text accompanying note 181.
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which competing products were produced. Company A did not
specify the amount of business lost or the specific products
involved.
Seven of the eight companies, including the Export Credit Corporation and Company A, stated that they had found alternative
sources for loan guarantees or credit insurance and had proceeded
with planned transactions using these sources. The eighth, Mesta
Machine Company, stated that it had decided to go through with
planned transactions in South Africa without loan guarantees or
insurance. In addition, Piper Aircraft stated that even if it had
planned to use Eximbank financing support between 1979 and
1982, it would have proceeded with its transactions without loan
guarantees or insurance.
The responses of the seven companies that utilized alternate
financing indicated that most of the new financing appeared to be
primarily local South African sources. Boeing stated that since
the passage of the Evans Amendment, it had exported four model
747 and thirteen model 737 aircrafts to South African Airways
through financing arranged by South African Airways. Wean
United stated without further elaboration that its new source of
financing had been local. Mack Trucks and Company A both said
that their purchasers had arranged financing through South African banks. Bucyrus-Erie stated that its purchasers had obtained
funds through alternative sources, but did not specify the type or
locality of the new sources. Harnischfeger reported that its purchasers had arranged for alternative financing support either
from South African or international banks. The Export Credit
Corporation said that it had obtained third-country insurance to
support its South African transactions from the Export Credits
Guarantee Department (ECGD), the British counterpart to the
Eximbank.2 1 2
In the aggregate, the responses of the ten companies suggest
two general conclusions. First, the level of United States exports
to South Africa by companies formerly using the Eximbank's services has been largely unaffected. by the Evans Amendment. Second, Eximbank assistance in South Africa has merely duplicated
the financing services already available in South Africa and has
even, in some cases, supported transactions that would have

212. The ECGD is also an executive agency of the British Government. Information obtained from the office of Wendell H. Jones, Vice President, Export
Credit Corp., New York, N.Y.
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taken place without any guarantees or insurance. Because the
Bank was created to promote transactions that in its absence
would not take place, its presence in South Africa may have been
highly questionable and perhaps ultra vires.213
Assuming that the data obtained from the survey is reliable for
the purposes of generalization and that the conclusions drawn
from the data are reasonable, the moral arguments for terminating Eximbank activity because of the Government's apartheid
policies in South Africa can be coupled with the economic argument that the Bank's services are largely nonessential. The position that the Bank should support transactions that would occur
without its services appears to be totally without support. Moreover, the support of such transactions would run contrary to the
Bank's charter.2 14 It would be even more difficult to argue that
the Bank should support and, in effect, subsidize these transactions when strong moral arguments oppose any support that
would further the apartheid policy of the South African
Government.
In the second part of the questionnaire, most companies expressed an awareness or concern over the possible adverse effects
on their businesses of foreign governmental financing support to
foreign competitors. None of the companies, however, admitted to
a specific instance in which the unavailability of Eximbank support had placed it at a significant competitive disadvantage. One
company, Bucyrus-Erie, went so far as to state that the type of
equipment2 1 5 for which it had received Eximbank financing support in the past is manufactured exclusively in the United States.
Mack Trucks and Mesta Machine Company expressed a suspicion
that they had lost business to foreign competitors because of the
more attractive financing terms that are available to those com-

213. Of course, the results obtained from a sampling of approximately onethird of the recipients of the Bank's total assistance to South Africa could be
misleading, and a survey of the remaining recipients could provide significantly
different results. Also, the duplication of financial services that the Bank seemed
to provide in South Africa may have become available only in recent years. The
alternative financing schemes currently available in South Africa were not as
prevalent a few years ago, and may have been created solely in response to the
withdrawal of Eximbank support.
214. The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended, provides that the
Bank should "supplement and encourage, and not compete with private capital." 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(1)(B) (1982).
215. Walking draglines.
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petitors. Mack Trucks recognized that the ECGD offers support
to British exporters, but without access to the quoted prices of
the British exporters it could not readily gauge the significance of
the ECGD support. Harnischfeger also expressed concern about
its British competition that received ECGD support. Mesta Machine Company stated without elaboration that Japanese and European financing support had placed it at a significant competitive disadvantage. Finally, although Company A could not
identify any specific instances in which the unavailability of Eximbank support had placed it at a significant competitive disadvantage, it did state in a separate letter that its South African
customer, Barlow Rand, had made sourcing changes based on
Barlow Rand's ability to receive credit support from the governments of other nations in which products competing with those of
Company A were produced.
In the aggregate, the responses from the second part of the
questionnaire suggest that the continued availability of foreign financing support for foreign competitors had not significantly affected United States companies exporting goods to South Africa
since the passage of the Evans Amendment. This conclusion is
consistent with the findings of the first part of the survey in
which only two companies2 16 stated that they had lost business
because of the Evans Amendment.
The third part of the survey was designed to determine
whether the Evans Amendment had prompted any United States
companies to urge South African purchasers to improve their employment practices. All ten respondents to the survey responded
negatively to this question. This result was expected because it
would be most unusual for one company to ask another to change
its internal policies even when strong moral grounds exist for doing so.
The manner in which South African companies responded to
the State Department questionnaire indicates flaws in the United
States certification process. Company A indicated that its customer, Barlow Rand, had adopted a code of conduct similar to
the Sullivan principles prior to the issuance of the State Department questionnaire. Barlow Rand, however, refused to complete
the State Department questionnaire claiming that the questionnaire was an unreasonable burden because it required informa216. Possibly only one, if the response from Company A is favorably
interpreted.
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tion not only on Barlow Rand's Tractor Division to which Company A was selling equipment, but also on each of the several
hundred companies that comprise Barlow Rand. The information
requested in the questionnaire, therefore, would require several
hundred pages to complete. According to Company A, instead of
submitting the completed State Department questionnaire, evidence was presented by the Chairman of the Board of Barlow
Rand to both the Export-Import Bank and the State Department, along with their Chairman's statement to the many managers within Barlow Rand of the Company's commitment to nondiscrimination. Nonetheless, the State Department insists upon
completion of the questionnaire - and that's where the matter
still stands.2 17
The State Department questionnaire may have appeared too
burdensome for companies with several operating divisions or
subsidiaries. The instructions on the questionnaire, however,
clearly state that the information supplied from all divisions and
subsidiaries should be consolidated on one application, not used
to complete a separate application for each division or subsidiary.21 8 Nevertheless, collecting and consolidating the information
could prove difficult if different divisions or subsidiaries use different operating procedures and standards. Even for companies
with only a few operating divisions the questionnaire could be detailed and burdensome. On the other hand, any company that
had truthfully and seriously implemented a nondiscriminatory
employment policy would theoretically have the information requested in the questionnaire readily available as part of its own
self-monitoring and evaluating system regardless of the number
of operating divisions and subsidiaries. Companies that refused to
complete the questionnaire and submit to an on-site inspection
by the United States Embassy may well have been avoiding disclosure of their actual employment practices rather than protesting an unreasonably heavy reporting burden.
Implicit in the State Department's refusal to accept evidence of
Barlow Rand's commitment to nondiscrimination is a distrust of
corporate self-policing. A similar incident occurred in 1978 when
Dresser Industries refused to sign the Sullivan principles because
reporting and independent monitoring requirements had been

217. Company A's response to survey.
218. See State Department Questionnaire infra Appendix 2, General
instructions.
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added. The Sullivan organization, like the State Department, refused to retreat from the positi6n that its reporting and monitoring requirements had to be met.219
Barlow Rand's disclosure of information regarding its employment practices to the State Department and the Eximbank brings
into question the proper scope and enforcement of the South African Protection of Businesses Act. Under the Act, a company
must receive permission from the South African Minister of Economic Affairs before supplying any business information in response to a foreign request

220

If the Minister of Economic Affairs

assented to Barlow Rand's disclosure of information about its employment practices, then it is unclear why the State Department
placed four applications for certification on hold and instructed
the United States Embassy to turn away fifteen to twenty other
applicants. The apparent inconsistency in the State Department's
perception of how the South African Government will apply the
Protection of Businesses Act and the actual application of the Act
requires further analysis.
The Minister of Economic Affairs may have found the disclosure requirements of the State Department's questionnaire to be
unacceptable because they asked for a more thorough description
of employment practices than Barlow Rand would be allowed to
offer under the Act. Alternatively, Barlow Rand may never have
requested permission from the Minister on the assumption that
permission would have been denied. In either case, it is hard to
explain why officers of nineteen to twenty-four South African corporations would have knowingly exposed themselves to possible
criminal prosecution for violations of the Protection of Businesses
Act by applying for State Department certification. One explanation could be that the South African Parliament did not intend
the Act to function as a blanket prohibition on the release of information, but instead, to operate as a device that South African
corporations could use at their option when releasing information
to a foreign party might prove embarrassing. If the "option" explanation is correct, then the State Department's refusal to reveal
the identities of the certification applicants must have been motivated by reasons other than a concern that South African corporate officers would be prosecuted. By refusing to release the applicants' names, the State Department may have sought to avoid
219. DresserIndustries and South Africa, supra note 165, at 11.
220. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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embarrassing the South African Government and possibly creating a diplomatic rift by disclosing the names of corporations that
had decided not only to violate South African law, but to do so in
order to comply with the extraterritorial application of United
States law.
The extraterritorial application of United States law has been a
source of friction between the United States and South Africa as
well as between the United States and some of its other trading
partners. Legislation passed by at least two of these nations in
the last five years indicates that the South African response to
the Evans Amendment was a predictable reaction to attempts by
the United States to extend the application of its laws to other
countries. In 1980, both the United Kingdom and France passed
legislation designed to block the extraterritorial application of
United States antitrust law to British and French nationals and
businesses. 221 The British legislation, the Protection of Trading
Interests Act, empowers the Secretary of State to forbid British
citizens, businesses, and non-British citizens located in the
United Kingdom from complying with the requirements of foreign courts, tribunals, or authorities to produce commercial documents or information when those requirements (1) infringe on the
jurisdiction or otherwise prejudice the sovereignty of the United
Kingdom, (2) prejudice "the security of the United Kingdom or
• . .the relations of the government of the United Kingdom with
the government of any other country," (3) are "made otherwise
than for the purposes of civil or criminal proceedings which have
been instituted in the overseas country," or (4) compel "a person
to state what documents relevant to any such proceedings are or
have been in his possession, custody or power or to produce for
the purposes of any such proceedings any documents other than
'2 22
particular documents specified in the requirement.
The United Kingdom's Protection of Trading Interests Act is
similar to South Africa's Protection of Businesses Act in that it
restricts the production of information. Significant differences between the two pieces of legislation, however, make the South Afri-

221. The British statute is the Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch.
II. The French statute is the Relative A la communication des documents et des
personnes physiques ou morales 6conomique, commercial ou technique A Lggislation [D.S.L.] 285, translatedin Herzog, The 1980 French Law on Documents
and Information, 75 Am.J. INT'L L. 382 (1981).
222. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. II, § 2(2)-(3).
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can law potentially more restrictive. First, the Protection of Businesses Act absolutely prohibits South African companies from
furnishing information in response to foreign requests.2 23 Intervention by the Minister of Economic Affairs, however, can create
exceptions to the prohibition. The Protection of Trading Interests
Act, on the other hand, operates in just the opposite way by generally permitting British companies to furnish information in response to foreign requests, and requiring the intervention of the
Secretary of State to prohibit the release of information.2 2 4 Second, while the British law applies only to requests from foreign
courts, tribunals, and authorities, the South African law applies
to "any order, direction or letters of request issued or emanating
from outside the Republic. '225 The South African law, therefore,
appears to prohibit the release of information to a broader range
of foreign entities. Last, and most significant, the Secretary of
State can invoke the British law only under the four broad circumstances enumerated above. The South African law prohibits
the furnishing of information under any circumstances with exceptions only to be granted as the Minister of Economic Affairs
deems fit. Because the South African law does not provide a set
of conditions under which information must be released, it is potentially far more restrictive than the British law.
The French law is similar to the South African law in that it
essentially prohibits the release of information in response to foreign requests. 2 6 In contrast to the British law, no intervention by
a French Government cabinet official is required to bar the release of information. 227 The French law is similar to the British
law in that its application is limited to requests from foreign public authorities or from persons seeking to use the information as
evidence in foreign judicial proceedings.2 2 In contrast to the
South African law, which applies to all foreign requests for information under any circumstances, the French law applies only
when disclosure "would threaten the sovereignty, security, or essential economic interests of France or public order, as defined by
223. Protection of Businesses Act, supra note 161, § 1(1).
224. Section 2 of the Act gives the Secretary of State discretion to prohibit
compliance.
225. Protection of Businesses Act, supra note 161, § 1(1)(b).
226. Law No. 80-538, 1980 D.S.L. 285, arts. 1-1 bis translatedin Herzog,
supra note 221, at 382-83.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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government authorities to the extent deemed necessary. '' 22
The State Department's refusal to process the nineteen to
twenty-four applications from South African corporations and decision not to disclose the identities of those corporations may
have been motivated by a desire not to embarrass the South African Government. Several recent developments seem to support
this interpretation. During the middle of 1982, the State Department and the Government of South Africa agreed upon a revised
questionnaire to be used in the certification process.2 30 The
changes in the revised questionnaire were more cosmetic than
substantive, however, and apparently were designed to lower the
profile of the United States Government. The revised questionnaire makes it less obvious that by filing the application, South
African corporations are subjecting themselves to the extraterritorial application of United States law. For example, the original
questionnaire twice expressly referred to a section of the ExportImport Bank Act of 1945. In the revised questionnaire, all references to the Act have been deleted.
A second change, which presumably was made to placate the
South African Government, appears in the question that asks
whether the company has endorsed certain fair employment practices. 23 1 A reference in the original question to "industrial discriminatory laws" was changed to "discriminatory employment
practices." Because the South African Government maintains
that its laws under apartheid are nondiscriminatory, the questionnaire was revised to avoid a direct charge of discrimination
against the South African Government.
The revised questionnaire contains two other changes that were
made either to mask the extraterritorial application of United
States law or to assert the sovereignty of the South African Government. First, in Question 25 the words "in making the required
certification" were deleted in the revised version. The apparent
purpose of the deletion was to make it less obvious to the applicant that by completing the questionnaire it became subject to
the extraterritorial application of United States law. Second, the
reference to on-site inspections conducted by the United States

229. Id. art. 1, translated at 382-83.
230. Interview with Emile Skodon, Economic Officer of Southern Africa Office, U.S. State Department, (Mar. 2, 1983). For a copy of the revised questionnaire, see infra Appendix 4.
231. This question appears as Question 12 in the revised questionnaire.
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Embassy in the instructions accompanying the questionnaire was
changed from "will include . . . on-site visits" to "may find it
necessary to verify the information . . . with on-site visits." The
deleted language may have offended the South African Government's sense of sovereignty, or the United States Government
may have decided that it would no longer require on-site inspections of every applicant's work facilities. If the latter interpretation is correct, the State Department granted a very significant,
substantive concession to South African companies.
The substantive changes in the questionnaire generally seem to
have been made to lessen the bureaucratic burden on South African companies to collect and categorize business information. For
example, Question 18 asked for the number of workers from each
racial group that were employed in the different categories of
skilled and unskilled labor. The State Department reduced the
number of grades or levels of skill from eleven to five, thereby
decreasing the complexity and, presumably, the time and effort
required to complete the questionnaire. The instructions to the
revised questionnaire contain another change that was apparently
made to lessen the bureaucratic burden on South African companies. The questionnaire originally provided that "[a]nswers
should include consolidated information on all corporate divisions
and subsidiaries." The revised questionnaire provides that
"[a]nswers should include consolidated information on all corporate divisions. In the course of the certification process, information may be requested concerning any corporate parents or concerning subsidiaries which would benefit directly from the
proposed purchase." This revision is very significant for large
South African corporations such as Barlow Rand, which under
the original questionnaire would have been required to provide
information on all corporate divisions and subsidiaries. The revised questionnaire only allows the State Department to request
information about subsidiaries that would "benefit directly" from
the proposed purchase. The meaning of "benefit directly" is not
defined in the questionnaire and conceivably could become a
source of dispute.
In addition, the original questionnaire required the South African purchaser to indicate whether it had "publicly supported" the
fair employment practices delineated in the questionnaire. The
revised questionnaire requires the purchaser to indicate whether
it had "publicly or otherwise endorsed" the fair employment
practices. The change implies that other less overt, and less asser-
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tive ways of endorsing fair employment practices may be acceptable to the State Department, and a South African corporation
might theoretically be eligible for Eximbank financing support
without publicly communicating its endorsement of the fair employment practices. If, in fact, public endorsement is no longer
required for certification, the goal of the United States Congress
to push the private sector towards widespread reform through the
"bandwagon" effect of public announcements will probably fail
because the Evans Amendment does not provide any incentives
for the private sector to force governmental reforms. On the other
hand, the political and social opposition of South African whites
to the implementation of fair employment practices could be minimized if the endorsements were made with a low profile.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

The Evans Amendment is an example of legislation that had
the opposite effect of that which was congressionally intended.
The Amendment was designed as a compromise to keep the Eximbank in South Africa, but its effect has been the termination of
Eximbank activity in that country.
The United States exporters that expected to be hurt by the
termination of Bank activity have apparently been largely unaffected because of the availability of other financing sources, particularly within South Africa. As a result, foreign competitors
with uninterrupted financing support from their own governments have failed to make significant inroads into the business of
United States exporters in South Africa that were formerly supported by the Eximbank. From 1978 to 1980, United States exports to South Africa rose by 128 percent- 2 32 a favorable increase when compared to those experienced by2 33the United
Kingdom, West Germany, Japan, France, and Italy.
The effect of the Evans Amendment on employment practices
in South Africa is as yet undetermined, although it is known that
between nineteen and twenty-four companies considered their
practices progressive enough to apply for certification under the
original State Department questionnaire, with three more compa232. 1974-80 TRADE STAT. Y.B., supra note 9, at 230.
233. Between 1978 and 1980, the United Kingdom experienced an 82% increase, id. at 377; West Germany a 64% increase, id. at 168; Japan an 83%
increase, id. at 226; France a 58% increase, id. at 161; and Italy an 88% increase, id. at 218.
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nies having applied under the revised questionnaire.2 34 United
States companies, however, have stated that the Amendment did
not cause them to urge South African purchasers to change their
employment practices.
The Evans Amendment probably has had very little real effect
on the policies of the South African Government, particularly
with respect to the elimination of apartheid and the attainment
of majority rule. The congressional condemnation of apartheid in
the form of the Evans Amendment probably had a significant
psychological impact on the South African Government, although
it remains to be seen whether the Evans Amendment will ultimately be viewed as an isolated instance of legislative initiative or
as the first significant step taken by the United States Government in its attempts to persuade the South Africans to adopt majority rule.
In a more global context, the reaction of the South African
Government to the Evans Amendment supports the premise that
governments will act to block the extraterritorial application of
another nation's laws if those laws are regarded as having unfavorable political or economic consequences that outweigh the
benefits of compliance. In the instant case, relatively minor
changes in the wording of the questionnaire and in the substance
of reporting requirements have tipped the balance in favor of
compliance. Whether or not South African companies will be willing to abandon their alternate sources of financing and attempt to
secure Eximbank financing support remains to be seen. From the
middle of 1982 to May of 1984, only three companies filed applications under the revised procedures. 235 Two have been certified
by the Secretary of State so that they are now eligible for Eximbank support. 236 However, no authorizations of any type have
been made yet.23 Those South African companies that have
found alternative sources of financing support may determine
that the political risks involved in utilizing financial support from
an agency of the United States Government are too great when

234. Interview with Emile Skodon, Economic Officer of Southern Africa Office, U.S. State Department (Feb. 15, 1984).
235. Interview of Robert Kott, Country Officer for South Africa, Department
of State (May 21, 1985).
236. Interview of Alice Mayo, Financial Economist for Africa and Middle
East, Export-Import Bank of the U.S. (May 21, 1985).
237. Id.
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compared to the reliability of their alternative sources. In addition, South African purchasers may determine that the bureaucratic burdens imposed by the United States reporting requirements are too onerous or that the risks of disclosing their actual
employment practices and then being subject to United States
and international criticism are too great to switch to the Eximbank for their financing support needs.
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APPENDIX 1
LAWS COMPELLING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION238
Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, No. 32 of 1961
Section 59 of the Act vests overriding sovereignty in Parliament. Sections 34 and 46, defining the qualifications of legislators,
restrict these to "white persons."
Electoral ConsolidationAct, No. 46 of 1946
Section 3 restricts the franchise to "white persons."
Population RegistrationAct, No. 30 of 1950
The Act establishes a register of all persons permanently resident in South Africa. Section 1 defines "Bantu" (black), a "white
person" and a "coloured person" (one who is not a "white person"
or a "Bantu"). Section 4 requires all persons permanently resident in South Africa to be registered, and Section 5 establishes a
race classification procedure and certain presumptions. Productions of race documents to peace officers are compulsory under
Section 14. Section 19 contains further presumptions, including,
in subsection (1), that a person who in appearance is obviously a
member of an aboriginal race or tribe of Africa is presumed to be
a Bantu (black), unless it is proved that he is not, in fact, or that
he is generally accepted as such a member. Race definitions in
this Act are incorporated by reference into other legislation. (See
examples mentioned below).
Group Areas Act, No. 36 of 1966
The Act imposes control throughout South Africa over interracial property transactions and interracial changes in occupation.
Under the Act, South Africa is being divided geographically into
areas in which eventually only persons of the same race will occupy or own land. The entire population is divided into racial
groups under Section 12. "Disqualified persons" (defined in Section 1) are prohibited from acquiring or occupying land or premises in areas where they are "disqualified." Disqualification results from membership in a different racial group from that
permitted to own or occupy the land or premises in question. Areas are divided into the controlled area, specified areas and group
areas. The controlled area (Section 1) covers the entire country
238. As of 1978, the following laws were in effect and were vigorously enforced. This compilation was informally checked by a member of the South African consulate in New York in February 1982. Since the passage of the Evans
Amendment, minor changes have been made in a few laws.
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except the "reserves" already set aside for exclusive black occupation. Specified areas are areas in transition to group areas, where
certain disqualifications are suspended during the transition
stage. Group areas represent final racial demarcations. Prohibitory provisions are Section 13, 14, 15, 20 controlled areas; Section
17 specified areas; and Sections 26 and 27 group areas. Pursuant
to delegated powers under the Act, proclamations have been issued defining occupation. Proclamation No. 288, 1973 identifies
the partaking of refreshments, attending class, and engaging in
certain other activities by disqualified persons as crimes. Proclamation No. 329, 1957, effectively prohibits a black from being employed as a "charge-hand, executive professional, technical or administrative employee, manager or supervisor" in a business in a
white area.
Reservations of Separate Amenities Act, No. 49 of 1953
The Act provides for race differentiation and discrimination in
the reservation of public premises and vehicles. Section 1 makes
it an offense for anyone to enter or use a segregated vehicle or
premises designated for a race other than his own, while Section 3
expressly sanctions inequalities in demarcating separate facilities.
Section 2A, read with Section 1 empowers segregation on
beaches. The definitions of "public premises" and "public vehicle" in Section 1 are extremely broad. Section 4 excludes foreign
diplomats and foreigners travelling on official business in South
Africa who have obtained certificates from the Secretary of External Affairs that specifically exclude them from the operation of
the Act.
Railways and Harbours Control and Management (Consolidation) Act, No. 70 of 1957
Section 7 provides for racial segregation on rail transportation
and railroad premises.
Motor Carrier TransportationAct, No. 39 of 1930
Section 13(2)(i)bis permits motor carrier certificates to provide
for segregated service.
Industrial ConciliationAct, No. 28 of 1956
This Act sets up the mechanism for collective bargaining. Section 1 defines "employee" to exclude blacks, and then defines
"trade union," to include "employees," and, therefore, precludes
blacks from the collective bargaining process. Section 77 empowers the Minister of Labour to make a determination reserving certain occupations to a particular racial group.
Mines and Works Act, No. 27 of 1956
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Section 12(2) (a) (replacing the corresponding provisions of Act
25 of 1926) empowers the authorities to restrict "certificates of
competency" for mines to whites and coloureds only, i.e., excluding blacks.
Factories,Machinery and Building Works Act, No. 22 of 1941
Section 51(h)bis provides for enforcing racial separation in
factories.
Prohibitionof Mixed MarriagesAct, No. 55 of 1949
This act prohibits marriages between "Europeans" and "NonEuropeans." Appearance is presumptive of race under Section 3.
"European" generally means "white" and "non-European" means
"non-white" in South Africa.
The Immorality Act, No. 23 of 1957
Section 16 makes sexual relations between races a crime.
Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, No. 25 of 1945
The Act tightly regulates blacks in urban areas. Section 1 defines "Bantu" as similarly defined under the Population Registration Act. Section 2 provides for separate areas within urban areas
for "Bantu occupation." Section 6 prohibits any black from acquiring any right to own or lease land in urban areas. Section 9
sets up machinery for enforcing segregation of "Bantus" in such
areas: Subsections (5) and (5) bis provide penalties for blacks being in non-black areas. Subsections (6) and (7) restrict black attendance at schools, churches, hospitals, and social gatherings.
Section 9 prohibits "non-Bantus" from entering segregated Bantu
areas. Section 10 is the notorious provision prohibiting blacks
(except under very restrictive exceptions) from being in any urban area for more than 72 hours. Section 12 prohibits "foreign
Bantus" from being in urban areas without permission from the
Secretary for Bantu Affairs. Section 28 provides for the forcible
removal of blacks who are in excess of the labor requirements
(termed "redundant Bantu") from urban areas. Section 29 sets
up a procedure for detaining and trying "idle or undesirable Bantus." Section 31 empowers local authorities to impose a curfew on
blacks.
Bantu Labour Act, No. 67 of 1964
The Act regulates "contract" black labour, sets up a complex
machinery for controlling the movement of blacks who seek work,
and sets up labour bureaus for blacks.
Bantu Building Workers Act, No. 27 of 1951
The Act prohibits blacks from performing skilled work in certain areas.
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Bantu (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents)
Act, No. 67 of 1952
The Act provides for the carrying of "reference books" by all
blacks, containing inter alia particulars of contracts of services or
employment. Nonpossession and nonproduction of reference
books are crimes. Section 1 defines "Bantu" the same as in Section 1 of the Population Registration Act.
Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act, No. 48 of 1953
The Act prevents strikes by blacks except under certain limited
conditions.
Bantu Education Act, No. 47 of 1953
The Act sets up separate schools for blacks and makes it a
crime to conduct a school or class for "Bantus" without official
permission.
Extension of University Education Act, No. 45 of 1959
Section 32 prohibits "non-white" students from registering and
enrolling at "white universities."
LAWS REPRESSING POLITICAL DISSENT239
Suppression of Communism Act, No. 44 of 1950
The Act outlaws the Communist Party of South Africa and any
organization that furthers the aims of communism. Broadly defined, communism includes "any other doctrine which aims at
changing the existing order of things in South Africa."
Section 5 of the General Law Amendment Act 37 of 1963 added
two capital offenses to the Suppression of Communism Act: (1)
Any past or present resident of South Africa who, while outside
South Africa, advocates (a) the intervention of a foreign power or
institution in achieving change in South Africa or (b) any of the
objects of communism, as defined in the Act, is guilty of a capital
offense; (2) Any past or present resident of South Africa who undergoes, incites, or encourages anyone else to undergo any sort of
training which could further the achievements of any of the objects of communism or receive information which could be of use
in furthering the achievements of any of the objects of communism is also guilty of a capital offense.
The Public Safety Act, No. 3 of 1953
The Act empowers the State President to declare a state of
239. The following list was compiled from J. JACKSON, Justice in South Africa 26-49 (1980).
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emergency for a period of twelve months and enact such regulations as appear necessary for the public safety. The Act was
designed to empower the government to prohibit mass protests
organized by the African National Congress and the South African Indians Congress. The penalty for violating the regulations
was, as of 1980, a fine not exceeding R1000 (roughly $1000) or five
years imprisonment or both. The Act, as amended, permits the
indefinite detention of any persons, subject to parliament receiving the names of detained persons after the lapse of thirty days.
The Criminal Law Amendment Act, No. 8 of 1953
This Act also is designed to counter mass protests. A protest is
defined under the Act to occur when two or more persons commit
similar offenses at the same time and place. Penalties provided
under the Act are a fine not exceeding R600, three years imprisonment, or ten strokes, or any two of the aforementioned penalties. Anyone inciting or in any manner encouraging a protest is
liable for a fine of R1000 or five years imprisonment or 10 strokes
or any two of the aforementioned penalties. Anyone assisting in a
protest campaign is subject to these same penalties.
The Riotous Assemblies Act, No. 17 of 1956
This Act makes it an offense to induce anyone by means of violence, threat, or restraint to do or not to do any act. (Under this
section, all pupils associated with the composition, printing, and
distribution of pamphlets for the peaceful boycotts of schools
were successfully prosecuted.) The Act provides for a fine of up to
R10,000, imprisonment of up to five years, or ten strokes, or any
two of the aforementioned penalties. These penalties apply to
anyone criticizing another who ignores a boycott.
The Prisons Act, No. 8 of 1959
This Act is designed to censor increasing newspaper reports of
prison brutality and mistreatment. It prohibits the publishing of
any false information concerning prisons with the knowledge that
such information is false or without taking reasonable steps to
verify such information. The burden of proving that reasonable
steps have been taken is on the accused. Because of court decisions relating to what constitutes reasonable steps, the effect of
the Act has been to inhibit reporting on prisons and prisoners. It
is also an offense to sketch or photograph prisons or prisoners
during or just prior to detention. Sketches or photographs of persons who have been executed or who have died in custody are also
prohibited. Penalties for violating the Act are a fine of $200 or
imprisonment of one year.
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The Unlawful OrganizationAct, No. 34 of 1960
This Act bans black political organizations and was aimed particularly at the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan
Africanist Congress (PAC). The banning was followed by a series
of arrests and political trials which stretched into 1966 and which
ended with nearly all the leaders of the ANC and PAC imprisoned. The Act put an end to lawful opposition by these parties. It
also spurred the formation of black organizations advocating
and municipal
governmental
violence against
planned
institutions.
The Publications and Entertainment Act, No. 26 of 1963
This Act prohibits the publication of undesirable material including anything that brings any section of the inhabitants of the
Republic into ridicule or contempt, or that harms the relations
between any sections of the inhabitants of the Republic. The Act
is used to censor any material which tends to show the oppression
of the black inhabitants by the whites.
The Civil Defense Act, No. 39 of 1966
The Act empowers the Minister of Defense to declare a state of
emergency and to invoke powers in addition to those already provided in other enactments. These new powers include provisions
for the takeover of property, the seizure of anything in the possession of suspicious persons, and the conscription and training of
persons between the ages of seventeen and sixty-five.
General Law Amendment Act, No. 62 of 1966
Section 22 of this Act permits a commissioned police officer to
hold a person in detention for fourteen days incommunicado if he
has reason to believe that the person is a terrorist or favors terrorist activities or has committed or intends to commit offenses
under the Suppression of Communism Act (Act 44 of 1950).
These provisions were invoked during the unrest of 1977-78. They
gave security police the time to interrogate persons and obtain
confessions without interference from their families or their
lawyers.
The Terrorism Act, No. 83 of 1967
This Act defines terrorism as any activity likely to endanger the
maintenance of law and order and whose results may promote or
cause general dislocation, disturbance or disorder; prejudice to
any industry or undertaking; the achievement of any political
aim, including the bringing about of any social or economic
change, by violent or forcible means; financial loss to any person
of the State; hostility between the races in the Republic; obstruc-
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tion to any movement of traffic on land, at sea or in the air; or
embarrassment to the administration of the affairs of state. Section 6 provides for indefinite detention without trial.
This Act was used in 1976 to convict nine members of the black
consciousness movement following a trial in which the movement's philosophy was at issue. The court extended the definition
of terrorism to include rebellious thoughts.
The Public Service Amendment Act, No. 101 of 1969
The Act creates the Bureau of State Security (now known as
the Department of National Security). The Department gathers
information by surveillance, mail interception, agents, and since
further enactments in 1976, telephone surveillance.
Section 29 authorizes the Prime Minister or his nominee, the
head of the Department, or any cabinet minister to prohibit the
giving of any evidence or the production of any document to any
court or statutory body if the evidence or document, in the official's opinion, is prejudicial to the interests of the State or public
security.
The Affected OrganizationsAct, No. 31 of 1974
The Act empowers the State President to declare an organization affected if he is satisfied that it is engaged in politics in cooperation with, or under the influence of, a foreign organization or
person. Once an organization is declared affected, it becomes a
criminal offense to canvass or bring money into South Africa on
behalf of such organization. Penalties for a first offense are a fine
not exceeding R10,000 or five years' imprisonment and for a second offense, penalties are a fine not exceeding R20,000 or ten
years' imprisonment. This Act effectively restricts foreign organizations from assisting organizations in South Africa seeking to alleviate the oppression of blacks.
Amendment to the Riotous Assemblies Act, No. 30 of 1974
This amendment increases the power of the police to disperse
gatherings. The amendment redefined a gathering from a group of
twelve or more people to a group of two or more. Earlier provisions required a magistrate to obtain authority from the Minister
of Justice to ban a gathering. The amendment, however, delegated this authority to the magistrate for a period of 48 hours.
The amendment also withdrew a requirement that the police give
warnings before dispersing a crowd by force. Finally, under the
amendment, any police officer was empowered to close any place,
whether public or private, where he believed a prohibited gathering might take place.

1984]

EXPORT-IMPORT BANK

The Internal Security Act, No. 79 of 1976
This Act widens the scope of the Suppression of Communism
Act by permitting the Minister of Justice to ban anyone who, in
his opinion, "engages in activities which endanger or are calculated to endanger the security of the State or the maintenance of
public order." The Act also provides for detention without trial
and the formation of a review board to review each detention
within two months of imposition. The courts are specifically excluded from reviewing the decision of the review board and the
Minister of Justice may disregard the advice of the review board.
The New Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51 of 1977
Section 112 drops the requirement that the police provide evidence to support a criminal defendant's plea of guilty. Thus, no
evidence is required to convict a defendant who pleads guilty as a
result of coercion or trickery. Section 217 places the burden of
proof on the defendant to prove that a confession made in writing
before a magistrate was not made freely and voluntarily. Section
218 provides that in cases where a confession is found inadmissible, facts found as a consequence of an inadmissible confession
are themselves admissible.
The Lower Courts Amendment Act, No. 91 of 1977
This Act expands the jurisdiction of regional magistrates'
courts to hear sabotage and terrorism cases. Prior to the Act only
the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear such cases. The Act
was passed in response to the Soweto riots of 1976 and was
designed to increase the speed with which convictions could be
obtained. By placing these cases in the lower courts the government also removed control of these cases from judges appointed
for life terms to magistrates who, as civil servants, depend entirely on the Department of Justice for promotion and salary. The
Minister of Justice could therefore exercise greater influence on
the outcome of cases.
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FORM OS-ISO0
10-713

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PURCHASERS IN THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA FOR PURPOSES OF CERTIFICATION
UNDER THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK ACT OF 1945, AS AMENDED
PURPOSE
This questionnaire requests information necessaryfor the Department of State to carry out its cartsficatlon functions under tection 2(b)(8c() of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945. asamended.
This section of the act requires the Secretary of State to certify that any purchaser located in South
Africa benefiting from Export-Import Bank guarantees or insurance has endorsed and proceeded toward
the Implementation of the following principles
" Nonsegregation of the racesin all work facilities:
* Equal andfair employment for all employees;
* Equal pay for equal work for 3l1 employees:
a- Initiation and development of training programs to prepam nonwhite South Africans for supervisory, administrative, clerical, and technical Jobs;
* Increasing the number of nonwhites in management and supervisorypositions;
" A willingness to engagein collective bargaining with labor unions: and
" Improving the quality of life for employees in areassuch as housing, transportation, schooling.
recreation, and health facilities.
The purpose of this questionnaire is to give purchasers the opportunity to record their endorsement
and describe In specific terms the measuresthey havetaken towards the implementation of these principles.
All purchasers in the Republic of South Africa importing U.S. goods and servicesfor which guarantees or Insurance havebeen requested from the Export-Import Bank, or from Bank-supported programs of
the Foreign Credit Insurance Association, must complete this questionnaire and return it to the U.S.
Embassy.
Additional questionnaires are available at the Export-Import Bank and at the Departnent of State
In Wathington, D.C., and at the U.S. Embassy and U.S. consulates in the Republic of South Africa.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Answers thould include consolidated information on all corporate divisions and subsidiaries. These
should be appropriately identified in question number 6.
Whlserea question reques-tstatistical or other data in a certain form, but ismost easily made available
by the purchaser in a different form which is substantively equivalent, this may be provided with appropriate explanation. Additional statistical data may be provided, even where not specifically requested,
All answersto
to supplement a responseto any question in the form most convenient for the purchaser.
questions referring to "nonwhite employees" should be provided, broken down into the following categories: blacks, coloreds, and Asians. Detailed replies to all questions will facilitate making the required
determination.
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Purchasers will be contacted and provided with the name of a U.S. Embassy or consulate officer
responsible for providing assistance
and resolving any special problems in completing this questionnaire.
Pleasenote that the completed questionnaire will be available to the general public, except for
portions which the Department of State determines to contain trade secrets or proprietary or confidential
businessinformation. Any information which the purchaser believes would fall into this category and which
it deemsnecessaryto include in its responsesto this questionnaire should beclearly identified as such.
The Department of State will make every effort to afford such information appropriate protection from
unauthorized disclosure consistent with U.S. law.
Purchasersare responsible for complying with all applicable South African laws in connection with
submitting this questionnaire.

EXPLANATION OF CERTIFICATION PROCESS
The self-described performance of the purchaser contained in the questionnaire will be a basis
for the Department's certification procedure. The completed questionnaire will be evaluaed by the U.S.
Mission in South Africa, a process which will include, inter alie, on-site visits, employee interviews, and
discussions with labor organizations and other interested groups and individuals. In all appropriate cases
(e.g., interviews with employees on work premises). the consent of the purchaser will be requested. If
it appears necessary,supplemental information may be requested in writing from the purchaser.
In the initial certification decision for a purchaser, the information in the questionnaire, and information developed by the U.S. Mission, will be examined for satisfactory evidence that the purchaser has
endorsed the principles contained in the act and, within the 2 years preceding the date the questionnaire
was submitted, hastaken reasonable steps toward implementing eachof the principles.
Certifications will be reconsidered annually, and the questionnaire and evaluation procedure will be
utilized to make each certification decision. Subsequent annual certifications will require the purchaser
to demonstrate sustained progess towards implementing the principles, measured against the record of
the purchaser's previous submissions, including its implementation plans. Thus. certification under the
act thould be seenas an evolving process,based on criteria relevant to each purchaser and its lines of
business.
The US. Embassy, using the questionnaire and other information developed in the certification
press, will prepare for the Department of State its recommendation regarding certification. The Department in turn will conduct its own review of the casein light of the Embassy's report,including appropriate
interagency and other consultations, and prepare a final recommendation to the Secretary of State or his
delegate.
If the Secretary of State declines to certify the purchaser, or if the U.S. Embassynotifies the Department that a purchaser has not complied with certification requirements, the Export-Import Sank will be
so advised by the Department and the U.S. applicant for Export-Import Bank support in turn will be
informed by the Bank that it cannot proceed with the application.
Certifications of purchasers will be valid for a 12-month period beginning on the date the ExportImport Bank is notified of certification and for all transactions involving salesto such purchasers for which
the Bank Is asked to provide guirantees or insurance during this period. The Bank's normal operating
procedures will be in effect for all purchasers with valid certifications.
Purchaserswill be informed by the U.S. Embassy of the Department's final action on certification
at the sametime the Bank is notified of the decision.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OUESTIONNAIRE FOR PURCHASERS IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA FOR
PURPOSES
OF CERTIFICATION UNDER THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK ACT OF 1945, AS AMENDED
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I1. NONSEGREGATION OF THE RACES IN ALL WORK FACILITIES

a. Describethe rasures taken in the pnst 2 yelPn towardsIntegration of work flcilltia anddclnie any Plan, for fWtnnaction in this
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IV. EQUAL AND FAIR EMPLOYMENT FOR ALL EMPLOYEES
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V. EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK FOR ALL EMPLOYEES
13. Decribehoi your wae and slervyot
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VI.

INCREASING THE NUMBER OF NONWHITES IN MANAGEMENT AND
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TRADE AND INDUs"RY

PROTECT[ON OF BUSINESSES ACT
NO. 99 OF 1978
(AssrEN

DTO 20 JuN2, 1978]

[DATE oF CommzcEmENr: 4 AuGusr, 19781

(English text signed by the State President)
as amended by
Protection of Businesses Amendment Act, No. 114 of 1979

ACr
To restrict the enforcement in the Republic of certain foreign judgments, orders, directions,
arbitration awards and letters of request; to prohibit the furnishing of information relating
to businesses In compliance with foreign orders, directions or letters of request; and to provide for matters connected therewith.
L Prohibition of enforcement of certain foreign judgments, orders, directions, arbitrn
tion awards and letters of request and furnishing of Information relating to businesses In compliance with foreign orders, directions or letters of request.-() Notwithstanding anything
to the contrary contained in any law or other legal rule, and except with the permission
of the Minister of Economic Affairs(a) nojudgment, order, direction, arbitration award orletters ofrequest delivered,
given or issued or emanating from outside the Republic and arising from any
act or transaction contemplated in subsection (3), shall be enforced in the
Republic;
(b) no person shall in compliance with any order, direction or letters of request
issued or emanating from outside the Republic, furnish any information as
to any business whether carried on in or outside the Republic.
(2) The permission contemplated in subsection (1) (b) may(a) be granted either by notice in the Gazette or by written authority addressed
to a particular person;
(b) be granted subject to such conditions as the said Minister may deem fit;

(c) relate only to specified goods or businesses or classes of goods or businesses,

or to orders, directions or letters of request is.ued in or emanating from a
specified country;
(d) if it is granted by notice in the Gazette, relate only to specified persons or
classes of persons.
(3) In the application of subsection (1)(a) an act or transaction shall be any act or
transaction which took place at any time, whether before or after the commencement of
this Act, and is connected with the production, importation, exportation, refinement,
possession, use or sale of or ownership to any matter or material, of whatever nature,
whether within, outside, into or from the Republic.
[Sub-s. (3) substituted by s. I or Act No. 114 of 1979.1

2. Offences and penalties.-Any person who contravenes the provisions of section
1(1) (b) shall be guilty of an offence and on conviction liable to a fine not~exceeding two
thousand rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years or to both such
fine and such imprisonment.
(Issue No. 13)
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3. Repeal of section 2 of Act 94 of 1974.-Section 2 of the Second General Law
Amendment Act, 1974, is hereby repealed.
4. Short title and commencement.-This Act shall be called the Protection of Businesses Act, 1978, and shall come into operation on a date fixed by the State President by
proclamation in the Gazette.

(hsne No. 12)
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APPENDIX 4
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PURCHASERS IN THE REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
This questionnaire shall be completed by purchasers in the Republic of South Africa who wish to benefit from programs of the
Export-Import Bank of the United States, or from bank-supported programs of the foreign credit insurance corporation. To
be eligible for such benefits purchasers must receive certification
that they have endorsed and are proceeding toward implementation of the fair employment principles set out in question number
seven.
Completion of this questionnaire is the first step in the certification process. The completed questionnaire should be submitted to
the United States Embassy or the nearest U.S. consulate in the
Republic of South Africa. The Embassy or consulates may find it
necessary to verify the information in this questionnaire with visits to the purchaser by their personnel, interviews with the purchaser's employees, discussions with other interested groups, or
by other means. The consent of the purchaser will be requested in
such cases.
After the initial evaluation is completed, the completed questionnaire and all relevant information will be forwarded to the United
States Department of State, which will decide whether to grant
the necessary certification. The Export-Import Bank of the
United States will then be informed of the final decision on certification. If the certification is issued, the bank's normal operating
procedures will apply. If certification is denied, the bank will so
inform the purchaser and cease processing the application.
A new application providing additional information may be submitted at any time. Certifications will remain valid for all transactions for one year from the date that the Department of State
informs the Export-Import Bank that a certification has been issued. Subsequent certifications will be required so that progress
toward implementation of the fair employment principles can be
demonstrated.
Purchasers may submit additional information beyond that required in the questionnaire. All answers to questions referring to
"non-white" employees should be broken down into answers for
blacks, coloreds, and asians. Answers should include consolidated
information on all corporate divisions. In the course of the certification process, information may be requested concerning any cor-
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porate parents or concerning subsidiaries which would benefit directly from the proposed purchase. The completed questionnaire
will be available to the general public, except for portions which
the Department of State of the United States determines contain
proprietary information. The purchaser should indicate any information which is considered to be proprietary.
Questions about this questionnaire and requests for additional
copies should be submitted to the U.S. Embassy or a U.S. consulate in the Republic of South Africa.
I.

BASIC PURCHASER INFORMATION

1. Name of Purchaser
2. Address of Head Office
3. Place of Incorporation
4. If the purchaser is a subsidiary of another company please provide items 1-3 above for parent company also. If any subsidiaries
of the purchaser would benefit directly from the proposed
purchase, please provide items 1-3 for all such subsidiaries.
5. To what extent, if any, does the South African Government
have an equity interest in the purchaser?
6. Please describe the general lines of business activities of the
purchaser.
II. ENDORSEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
7. Does the company endorse the following fair
employment principles?
-Non-segregation of the races in all work
facilities.
-Equal and fair employment for all employees.
-Equal pay for equal work.
-Initiation and development of training programs
to prepare non-white South Africans for
supervisory, administrative, clerical and
technical jobs.
-Increasing the number of non-whites in
management and supervisory positions.
-A willingness to engage in collective bargaining
with labor unions.
-Improving the quality of life for employees in
such areas as housing, transportation, schooling,
recreation, and health facilities.

YES
YES
YES

YES NO
YES NO
YES NO
YES

NO
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Has this endorsement been communicated to all your
personnel? Please provide any written evidence of such
endorsement (corporate resolutions, company announcements
or publications, annual reports, etc.), if available.
III. NON-SEGREGATION OF THE RACES IN ALL WORK
FACILITIES
8. Describe the measures taken in the past 2 years towards integration of work facilities and describe any plans for future action
in this area. This description in particular should fully explain
implementation plans with respect to all facilities indicated as
"being integrated" in the following question. Integration in this
context means equal access by all races to the same facilities.
9. Provide the following information:
Being
Integrated Separate Integrated N/A
All facilities
(If integrated, go on to
next question)
Food service
Dining area
Toilet/shower facilities
Work areas
Locker rooms
Medical facilities
Recreation areas
Living quarters
IV. EQUAL AND FAIR EMPLOYMENT FOR ALL
EMPLOYEES
10. Describe, with reference to specific measures during the past 2
years, steps the company has taken to advance the goal of equal
and fair employment practices, terms and conditions for all employees, and indicate future objectives in this area. In particular,
please include a description of general employee benefits; for example, medical, pension, and insurance benefits, and indicate
whether such benefit programs are fully integrated and available
on an equal basis to white and non-white employees; whether
costs and coverage are the same for both; the number of white
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and non-white employees who are beneficiaries of such programs;
and the relative amounts spent by the purchaser on such programs or benefits for white and non-white employees.
11. Has the Company established a comprehensive procedure for
handling and resolving individual employee complaints on a nondiscriminatory basis? Describe.
12. Has the company publicly or otherwise endorsed the elimination of discriminatory employment practices which are contrary
to the principle of equal and fair employment opportunities?
V. EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK FOR ALL
EMPLOYEES
13. Describe how your wage and salary structure gives effect to
the objective of equal pay for equal work for all employees. Please
indicate any specific steps taken in the past 2 years to advance
this objective, and any plans for future action in this area.
14. In particular, for each of the past 2 years, provide specific information on average wages and average wage increases, by grade
and race, consistent with the descriptions in question 18, with any
necessary explanation of differences in wages or rates of wage increases between races in the same grade.
VI. INCREASING THE NUMBER OF NON-WHITES IN
MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISORY POSITIONS;
INITIATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF TRAINING
PROGRAMS TO PREPARE NON-WHITE SOUTH
AFRICANS FOR SUPERVISORY, ADMINISTRATIVE,
CLERICAL, AND TECHNICAL JOBS
15. What has the company done to promote job advancement for
non-white employees? Describe the firm's policy in this area, in
particular your policy and practice regarding non-whites in supervisory positions. Please include specific information on the number of non-white employees who have moved into job categories
formerly limited to whites in each of the past 2 years and describe
any future objectives in this area.
16. Describe the training offered to prepare your workers for supervisory, administrative, clerical and technical employment. For
each of the past 2 years, please include information on the kinds
of programs offered and indicate whether such programs are offered to all races on an equal basis, the number of participants in
each program, by race, and the total amount spent on training, by
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race.
17. How many people of each race does your company employ?
-- Blacks
-- Whites
-- Coloreds
-- Asians
18. What proportion of each race is in each grade?
Blacks Whites Coloreds Asians
-Senior Management
-Middle and Lower
Management
-Clerical Workers
-Skilled Labor
-Unskilled Labor
VII. WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING WITH LABOR UNIONS
19. Describe company policy with regard to insuring respect of
equal trade union rights and opportunities for all employees regardless of race. Is the company willing to engage in collective
bargaining with non-white labor unions? Does your firm have a
set of conditions under which you will recognize and negotiate
with non-white unions? Has this policy been communicated to all
employees?
20. How are your non-white employees in fact represented? On
whose initiative was the representative institution created?
21. Are wages negotiated with employee representatives from all
employee racial groups? If no, how are they determined?
22. Describe the extent of your dealings with non-white unions
during the past 2 years, including attempts to organize and requests of organizers for access to facilities.
VIII. IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LIFE FOR
EMPLOYEES IN SUCH AREAS AS HOUSING,
TRANSPORTATION, SCHOOLING, RECREATION, AND
HEALTH FACILITIES.
23. Describe the measures the purchaser has taken in the past 2
years, and future plans, to improve the quality of life of nonwhite employees, and where applicable, their dependents, outside
the work environment in housing, transportation, education, recreation, health facilities, and other areas. Examples might include
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literacy education programs, scholarships and other educational
assistance, financial assistance for housing, special programs for
migrant workers, including measures to keep families of migrant
workers united, etc. Please include information as to whether all
such company benefits or programs are available on an equal basis to white and non-white employees; whether costs and coverage
are the same for both; the number of beneficiaries, by race, of all
such programs; and the amount spent on such programs, by race.
24. In areas where laws and regulations relating to race cause recurrent problems for your employees (pass laws, group areas act,
etc.), what provision do you make to improve the quality of life
by counseling and assistance (including legal assistance) in dealing with the authorities?
IX.

GENERAL

25. Please provide any additional information you believe
relevant.

